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THE HIDDEN RIGHT TO DIRECT APPEAL
FROM A FEDERAL PLEA CONVICTION
Paul D. Bormant
INTRODUCTION
Eighty-five percent of' the convictions in federal courts 1 arise
from guilty pleas2 or their substantial equivalent, pleas of* nolo
contendere, thereby saving the government the time and expense
involved in holding tens of' thousands of trials. Although the Su-
preme Court has noted the importance to the criminal justice sys-
tem of prompt, final convictions secured by pleas of guilty: and
has limited the issues that can be raised on appeal or collateral
attack,4 it has also recognized that a guilty plea conviction is "no
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. B.A. 1959, J.D. 1962, Univer-
sity of Michigan; .LL.M. 1964, Yale University. The author thanks his good friends and
colleagues, Professors LeRoy L. Lamborn and Joseph D. Grano for their editorial advice,
and Walter Kozar, Wayne State University Law School class of 1978, for his assistance in
the preparation of footnotes for this Article.
Statistics for the fiscal year 1976 reveal that 34,041 of the 40,112 convictions in the
federal courts were by plea. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, [1976] ANNUAL REPORT, Table D-7, reprinted in JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 73,368 app. (1976). See also DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, [1973] ANNUAL REPORT, Table D-7 (30,852 of the 37,261
convictions (83%) in the federal courts in fiscal year 1973 by plea), reprinted in JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 87, 416 app. (1973).
2 "The American system of criminal justice is not a system of trial by jury but one
directed to the obtaining of guilty pleas.... [Elvery effort is made to maintain the number
of guilty pleas at high levels, and this objective prevails over every other competing goal."
Allen, Central Problems of American CriminalJustice, 75 MICH. L. REv. 813, 819 (1977). Most
guilty pleas are the result of plea bargain negotiations between defense counsel and the
prosecution. See Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts,
89 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1975).
3 If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the
Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of
judges and court facilities.
Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of
the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to prompt
and largely final disposition of most criminal cases ....
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971).
4 When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in
fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise
independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that oc-
curred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary
and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he re-
ceived from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann.
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more foolproof than full trials to the court or to the jury. Accord-
ingly, we take great precautions against unsound results, and we
should continue to do so, whether conviction is by plea or by
trial."'  The Court has upheld the right to challenge a guilty plea
conviction for the following reasons:
1. The plea was induced by an unkept promise;'
2. The plea resulted from improper promises, coercion,
or deception; 7
3. The defendant pleaded without being informed of a
critical element of the offense; 8
4. The defendant pleaded without the assistance of coun-
sel, or did not receive effective assistance of counsel; 9
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Accord, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 768-71 (1970). But see Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976). Justice Stevens
wrote for the majority:
We also accept petitioner's characterization of the competence of respondent's
counsel and of the wisdom of their advice to plead guilty to a charge of
second-degree murder. Nevertheless, such a plea cannot support a judgment of
guilt unless it was voluntary in a constitutional sense.' 3
13 A plea may be involuntary either because the accused does not under-
stand the nature of the constitutional protections that he is waiving, see, e.g.,
Johnson v. Zerbst, ... or because he has such an incomplete understanding of
the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.
Id. at 644-45 & n.13 (citation omitted). In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), the
Court stated:
While petitioners' reliance upon the Tollett opinion is understandable, there
is a fundamental distinction between this case and that one. Although the un-
derlying claims presented in Tollett and the Brady trilogy were of constitutional
dimensions, none went to the very power of the State to bring the defendant
into court to answer the charge brought against him. ... Unlike the defendant
in Tollett, Perry is not complaining of "antecedent constitutional violations" or
of a "deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the
guilty plea." ... Rather, the right that he asserts and that we today accept is the
right not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge.
Id. at 30 (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973)). For a penetrating
analysis of Tollett and Blackledge, see Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture
of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214 (1977).
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).
6 See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971).
' See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213 (1973); Machibroda v. United States, 368
U.S. 487 (1962); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
s See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976).
See Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Walker v. Johnston,
312 U.S. 275 (1941).
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5. The district court judge, in accepting the plea, did not
comply with rule 11 of the Federal Rules of' Criminal
Procedure; 10
6. The transcript did not adequately show that the plea
was knowing and voluntary; " and
7. The due process clause prevented the state from
bringing the charge.1 2
Although the Constitution does not guarantee a right of ap-
peal, t'3 Congress, in 28 U.S.C. § 1291, has provided an appeal as
of right to the court of' appeals from district court judgments in
all criminal cases. 4  The two federal rules of" appellate procedure
governing appeals under section 1291 neither mention nor dif-
ferentiate between trial convictions and plea convictions.1 5 No
federal statute or rule of procedure specifically mentions a right
to appeal a plea conviction. The only rule whici discusses that
right casts doubt on its existence. Rule 32(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs the duty of the sen-
tencing judge to notify the defendant of the right to appeal, dif-
ferentiates drastically between the judge's obligation to trial-
convicted and to plea-convicted defendants:
After imposing sentence in a case which has gone to trial on a
plea of not guilty, the court shall advise the defendant of his
right to appeal and of the right of a person who is unable to
pay the cost of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma
pauperis. There shall be no duty on the court to advise the defendant
of any right of appeal qfter sentence is imposed following a plea of"
o See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). In Halliday v. United States, 394
U.S. 831 (1969), the Court declined to apply McCarthy to guilty pleas accepted prior to the
date of that decision.
" See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
'2 See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
'3 See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S.
684 (1894).
14 "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts ...." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). "The right of appeal, as we presently
know it in criminal cases, is purely a creature of statute ... 28 U.S.C. § 1291." Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977). Accord, United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850,
853 (1978).
" Rule 3(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure states: "An appeal permitted
by law as of right from a district court to a court of appeals shall be taken by iling a notice
of appeal with the clerk of the district court within the time allowed by Rule 4." Rule 4(b)
states: "In a criminal case the notice of appeal by a defendant shall be filed in the district
court within 10 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Rule 24(a),
which sets forth the procedure for seeking leave to appeal infonna pauperis, likewise does
not differentiate between trial- and plea-convicted defendants.
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guilty or nolo contendere. If the defendant so requests, the clerk
of the court shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal
on behalf of the defendant.
1 6
As originally enacted in 1966, rule 32(a)(2) required the sentenc-
ing judge to inform all trial-convicted defendants of both the
right to appeal and the right to apply For leave to appeal infbrma
pauperis.17  Because the rule did not mention plea-convicted de-
fendants, its intended coverage was ambiguous. The 1975
amendment to the rule (italicized above) eliminated this am-
biguity.
Although rule 32(a)(2) does not bar the judge from inform-
ing the defendant of the right to direct appeal, it absolves the
judge of any duty to do so. Further, the rule appears to have
misled many jlges, defense counsel and defendants to conclude
that there is no right to direct appeal from a plea conviction. Of
the 364 federal judges responding to a survey questionnaire pre-
pared by the author, 8 twenty-six percent (ninety-four respon-
dents) indicated that, when accepting a guilty plea, they advise the
defendant that a plea waives the right to direct appeal."9  This
advice is erroneous. One prominent federal district judge has
provided an example of this misunderstanding:
The reason there is no advice of right to appeal following a
plea of guilty is that there is no right to appeal, as I understand
the matter in such cases. I think this is not what the law should
be.... I always advise those who are about to plead that one of
the differences between a conviction after trial and on a plea of
guilty is that the right to appeal is lost.2 0
The survey also revealed that eighty-five percent (310) of' the
judges follow the suggestion of the 1975 amendment and, at sen-
tencing, do not advise the plea-convicted defendant Of any right
to appeal.2 ' This is not surprising; most judges would not volun-
teer information that could result in a challenge to a guilty-plea
16 FED. R. CRINI. P. 32(a)(2) (1975 amendment italicized).
17 FED. R. CRI5. P. 32(a)(2) (amended 1975).
18 In May 1977, the author conducted a two-question survey of all federal district court
judges and senior district court judges. Of the 501 judges contacted,' 387 judges re-
sponded; 23 of the responses were incomplete or nonresponsive. Thus, there were 364 net
responses-73% of the judges surveyed. The questionnaire and results are set forth in the
Appendix.
1, See Appendix.
20 Letter from Judge Jack B. Weinstein (E.D.N.Y.) to Author (July 1, 1976) (copy on
file at the Cornell Law Review).
21 See Appendix.
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conviction.22 Only fifteen percent (54) of the judges go beyond
the requirements of rule 32(a)(2) and advise the plea-convicted
defendant of the right to appeal.23
Thus, the obligation to advise the great majority of plea-
convicted defendants about the right to appeal falls on defense
counsel. Yet, there is no reason to assume that counsel will fulfill
this burden. Lack of faith in defense counsel to advise even trial-
convicted defendants of the right to appeal led to the adoption of
rule 32(a)(2) in 1966.24 Because counsel for a plea-convicted de-
fendant has negotiated and witnessed a resolution of the case by
plea, he is even less likely to notify the defendant of the right to
appeal. Not only could such advice overturn counsel's efforts, but
the grounds for appeal might reflect upon his own competence or
integrity.
The language of rule 32(a)(2), which appears to have misled
large numbers of federal district judges, is likely to similarly mis-
lead counsel for plea-convicted defendants to believe that there is
no right to appeal. Further likely to mislead defense counsel are
the local district court plans, adopted pursuant to the Federal
Criminal Justice Act,25  for appointment of counsel to represent
indigent federal defendants. Each of the six sample plans ap-
proved in 1965 by the Judicial Conference of the United States
for adoption by federal district courts contains the following lan-
guage: "In the event that a defendant is convicted following trial,
counsel appointed hereunder shall advise the defendant of his
right to appeal and of his right to counsel on appeal."26  None of
2 "A judge's desire to enhance his own reputation and to protect appellate courts from
an excessive number of appeals may prompt him to discourage appeals." Note, Limiting
Judicial Incompetence: The Due Process Right to a Legally Learned Judge in State Minor Court
Criminal Proceedings, 61 VA. L. REv. 1454, 1484-85 (1975).
2' See Appendix.
-" See FED. R. CRIMr. P. 32(a)(2) note (1966 Advisory Comm. Note). For discussion of
the note, see notes 98-103 and accompanying text infra.
25 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976).
26 Report of the Committee to Implement the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 36 F.R.D.
285, 289 (1964). The Committee recommended that the provision be included in "every
district court plan." Id. A spot check by the author of four district court plans on file with
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts indicates compliance with the rec-
ommendation. The plans covering the Southern District of California, the Eastern District
of Kentucky, the Eastern District of Michigan, and the Eastern District of New York all
include the provision.
Some districts, in addition to maintaining a file copy of their plan, transmit pertinent
portions to court-appointed counsel. For example, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan sends the following:
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the sample plans mentions the right to appeal a plea conviction or
the duty of counsel to provide appeal advice to plea-convicted de-
fendants.
It is unlikely that an unadvised, plea-convicted defendant who
wishes to challenge his conviction will discover the right and then
perfect a timely appeal or seek leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
The plea-convicted defendant who reads rule 32(a).(2) or the
applicable Criminal Justice Act plan is likely to conclude, as so
many judges have, that no right to appeal exists.
Failure to file a direct appeal within ten days after entry of
judgment 27 relegates the plea-convicted defendant to inferior col-
lateral remedies: 28 U.S.C. § 225528 or rule 32(d) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.29 Proceeding collaterally deprives
the plea-convicted defendant of an initial consideration by a
three-judge panel of the court of appeals, and restricts grounds
for reversal to errors of constitutional, jurisdictional or fundamen-
tal magnitude. 30  Moreover, on collateral attack the indigent,
plea-convicted defendant has no per se right to court-appointed
counsel 3 or transcripts of lower court proceedings.32 Although
notifying the plea-convicted defendant of the right to appeal
would be likely to significantly increase the number of appeals 33
TO APPOINTED COUNSEL:
We call your attention to "Section 3, Duties of Appointed Attorney," of the
Criminal Justice Act plan .... We reproduce the said section here in full:
In the event that a defendant is convicted following trial, counsel ap-
pointed hereunder shall advise the defendant of his right of appeal and his
right to counsel on appeal.
27 See FED. R. App. P. 4(b).
28 (1976), quoted in note 66 infra. Although motions under § 2255 or rule 32(d) are
deemed further steps in the criminal proceeding, this Article designates as collateral all
postconviction litigation apart from direct appeal.
29 Quoted in text accompanying note 54 infra. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure is available to challenge the sentencing proceeding. For discussion of rule 35,
see note 119 infra.
" For a comparison of the benefits of direct appeal with those of collateral attack, see
notes 80-91 and accompanying text infra.
11 Cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (indigent defendant not entitled to court-
appointed counsel on discretionary appeal).
32 See United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976) (plurality opinion).
33 "Professor Carrington is right in saying that if even a small percentage of those
convicted on pleas of guilty should appeal their sentence, 'the courts would be swamped.'
H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 37 (1973) (quoting Carrington,
Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National
Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 542, 578 (1969)).
324 [Vol. 64:319
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in an already overburdened system,3 4 the right of all defendants
to appeal deserves protection:
Appeals are an important part of the solemn process and
symbolism that are vital to the legitimacy of criminal law en-
forcement. In overseeing trial court proceedings, appellate
courts are special symbols of the respect our legal system ac-
cords to individual rights and concerns. They provide visible
assurance to the accused and to society that the criminal law is
being administered fairly and lawfully.
35
This Article initially discusses the right of a plea-convicted de-
fendant to direct appeal as noted in decisions of the Supreme
Court and most federal courts of appeals. Next it reviews the ad-
(,antages of direct appeal over collateral remedies, and examines
the legislative intent behind rule 32(a)(2) as originally drafted and
then as amended. The Article then evaluates the constitutionality
of the following:
1. A sentencing judge informing a plea-convicted defend-
ant that a guilty plea waives the right to appeal;
2. A sentencing judge not informing a plea-convicted
defendant of the right to appeal;
3. Rule 32(a) (2) insofar as it conceals from a plea-
convicted defendant knowledge of his right to appeal,
and distinguishes between the two classes of defendants
convicted in federal courts; and
34 "The annual number of federal appellate cases has increased from about 5,000 to
about 15,000 over the past decade. An exponential projection at this rate of increase yields
a caseload of I million sometime between the years 2010 and 2015." Barton, Behind the
Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REv. 567, 567 n.2 (1975). Judge Henry Friendly of the Second
Circuit has stated:
Not surprisingly, criminal appeals more than quadrupled [between 1960 and
1972]; with the Government providing a free lawyer and a free transcript for
an indigent defendant, more liberal bail procedures, and, except in most un-
usual cases, an assurance against a heavier sentence on retrial, it is hard to see
why almost every convicted defendant should not appeal.
H. FRIENDLY, supra note 33, at 32 (footnote omitted).
35 P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JDSTIGE ON APPEAL 58 (1976). A re-
cent Supreme Court decision reinstating a summarily dismissed collateral attack on a plea
conviction resolved the issue in similar terms:
[A]rrayed against the interest in finality is the very purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus-to safeguard a person's freedom from detention in violation of
constitutional guarantees .... And a prisoner in custody after pleading guilty,
no less than one tried and convicted by a jury, is entitled to avail himself of the
writ in challenging the constitutionality of his custody.
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 72 (1977).
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4. A defense attorney not informing his plea-convicted
client of the right to appeal.
In conclusion, the Article sets forth recommendations designed to
protect the right to direct appeal from a plea-conviction.
I.
THE RIGHT TO DIRECT APPEAL FROM A PLEA CONVICTION
The Supreme Court has held that acceptance of a guilty plea
by the trial judge is a conviction that warrants an entry of judg-
ment.3' Final judgment is the predicate for appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291; 3 7 in a criminal case, final judgment
means sentence. 38 The Court has recognized the right to appeal
all federal court convictions: "Present federal law has made aft
appeal from a District Court's judgment of conviction in a crimi-
nal case what is, in effect, a matter of right." 3' None of the three
sources cited in the Court's footnote 4°-28 U.S.C. § 1291,41 28
U.S.C. § 1294,42 or rule 37(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 43 the predecessor to rule 32(a)(2)-suggests that a
plea-convicted defendant does not possess the right to direct ap-
peal.
Although the great majority of challenges to federal plea-
convictions have been initiated by motions at the district court
level under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court has reviewed at least
two cases arising from a direct appeal of a guilty-plea conviction.
In McCarthy v. United States,4 4 the Court overturned a plea convic-
tion because the judge, in accepting the plea, had failed to comply
11 See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
17 See Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169, 174 (1963) (quoting Berman v. United
States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937)); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 360 n.4 (1957)
(quoting Miller v. Aderhold, 288 U.S. 206, 210 (1933)).
" See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853-54 (1978); Abney v. United
States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977).
'9 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 441 (1962). Coppedge was quoted with ap-
proval in Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1969), and Collins v. United
States, 418 F. Supp. 577, 580 (.D.N.Y. 1976), which added that "the fact that petitioners
pled guilty does not foreclose them from an appeal.") Id.
o Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 441 n.2 (1962).
4, (1976), quoted in note 14 supra.
42 "Appeals from reviewable decisions of the district and territorial courts shall be
taken to the courts of appeals as follows: (1) From a district court of the United States to
the court of appeals for the circuit embracing the district .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (1976).
(Repealed 1966), quoted in text accompanying note 96 infra.
394 U.S. 459 (1969).
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with the requirements of rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 45  Similarly, in Haynes v. United States,46 the Court, on
direct appeal, overturned a plea conviction because of ir-
regularities in the plea process. In neither decision, however, did
the Court discuss the significance of the fact that the case arose
on direct appeal rather than collateral attack.
Six federal courts of appealh have discussed at some length
the right to appeal after a plea conviction. Judge, now Justice,
Stevens pointed out both the existence of and advantage of direct
appeal in a Seventh Circuit opinion dismissing a collateral attack
on a plea conviction: "[The] district judge did not make as com-
plete and unambiguous a record of 'the factual basis for the plea'
as is contemplated by Rule 11. If this case were here on direct
appeal from defendant's conviction, we might well conclude that
these shortcomings constitute reversible error." 4 The Second, 48
Fourth,4:1 Fifth,50 Sixth, 51 and District of Columbia 52 Circuits have
also noted the existence of a right to direct appeal from a plea
conviction.
II.
COLLATERAL ATTACK OF A PLEA CONVICTION-
AN INFERIOR REMEDY
The two principal procedures for collateral attack of a federal
plea conviction are rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 5 3
45 Id. at 463-64. The principal requirements of rule 11 are set forth in note 112 infra.
46 390 U.S. 85 (1968). Although the Supreme Court opinion did not mention that post-
conviction proceedings had begun with a direct appeal, the court of appeals noted that
fact: "Haynes thereupon pleaded guilty, was sentenced to four years imprisonment and has
perfected this appeal." United States v. Haynes, 372 F.2d 651, 652 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd,
390 U.S. 85 (1968).
17 Arias v. United States, 484 F.2d 577, 579 (7th Cir. 1973) (citing McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969)), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 905 (1974).
41 See Del Vecchio v. United States, 556 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 634 (2d Cir. 1976).
4' See United States v. White, 572 F.2d 1007, 1009 (4th Cir. 1978).
o See United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80, 87 (5th Cir. 1975). Accord, United States v.
Adams, 566 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1978).
5 See Timmreck v. United States, 577 F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S.
Ct. 830 (1979); United States v. Hoye, 548 F.2d 1271, 1272 (6th Cir. 1977).
52 McCarthy was a direct appeal in which the Supreme Court, relying on its super-
visory power, reversed a conviction based on a guilty plea for a violation of
Rule 11 .... Appellant seeks to weaken the force of the fact that McCarthy was
a direct appeal, as distinct from a collateral attack ....
United States v. Watson, 548 F.2d 1058, 1062 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original).
53 Section 2255 did not entirely displace the writs of habeas corpus and corain nobis.
Although the Court in Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977), stated that "§ 2255 created a
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A. Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 32(d) specifically provides for postsentence challenge of
a guilty plea:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may
be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sen-
tence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after
sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defen-
dant to withdraw his plea.5 4
Although the defendant may withdraw his plea after sentence
only if he can prove a manifest injustice,5 he need not prove a
new postconviction remedy in the sentencing court and provided that a habeas corpus
petition may not be entertained elsewhere" (id. at 378), it noted that "[§] 2255 allows an
exception for the case in which the remedy is 'inadequate or ineffective"' (id. at n.10).
Accord, United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952). In United States v. Morgan,
346 U.S. 502 (1954), when the defendant sought to overturn a guilty-plea conviction and
the remedy provided by § 2255 was unavailable because he was not in custody under
federal sentence, the Court permitted him to proceed by writ of coram nobis under the All
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976). 346 U.S. at 505-06. Cf United States v. Gross, 446 F.
Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1978) (trial-convicted defendant permitted to petition for writ of coram
nobis because no longer in federal custody). See generally Note, Post-Conviction ielieffrom
Pleas of Guilty: A Diminishing Right, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 182 (1971); Note, Withdrawal of
Guilty Pleas Under Rule 32(d), 64 YALE L. J. 590, 590 n.4 (1955).
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides a means for attacking
sentences: "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sen-
tence imposed in an illegal manner within [120 days) ...."
A Rule 35 motion is used to attack the sentence imposed, not the basis for
the sentence....
... The 1966 amendment of Rule 35 added language permitting correction of
a sentence imposed in an "illegal manner." However, there is a 120 day time limit on
a motion to do this, and the added language does not clarify the intent of the rule or
its relation to § 2255.
R. GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 2 note (Advisory Comm. Note). For discussion of rule
35, see note 119 infra.
5' FED. R. CRINI. P. 32(d) (emphasis added). "Under Rule 32(d) a plea of nolo conten-
dere is treated as if it were a plea of guilty." Note, Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas in the Federal
Courts, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 366, 367 n.4 (1955).
11 "A popular formula is that withdrawal of the plea should be permitted if it was
induced by fraud, mistake, imposition, misrepresentation, or misapprehension by the de-
fendant of his legal rights ...." 2 C.A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 537,
at 465-66 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
The Advisory Committee Note accompanying a proposed amendment to rule 32(d)
provides the following examples of manifest injustice:
The most common instances of "manifest injustice" are where there has been
an "improper taking of a guilty plea" in significant noncompliance with rule 11,
United States v. Watson, [548 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1977)]; where it is shown that
the defendant was without competence to plead, United States v. Masthers, 539
F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1976); and where a plea bargain has not been kept, United
States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1976).
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
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denial of due process.,"  Rule 32(d) does not impose a time limit
for filing a postsentence motion,57 but delay in filing a collateral
attack is frequently cited as probative of the untruthfulness of a
defendant's allegations by courts seeking to justify denial of re-
lief.5 8
Although a proceeding under rule 32(d) is a criminal pro-
ceeding, the government is not required to provide counsel to as-
sist the indigent in preparing his motion.' 1  The rule 32(d)
motion is directed to the sentencing judge. If he permits the
defendant to withdraw his plea the case will be added anew to a
crowded docket.6" The judge may dispose of the claim without
PROCEDURE, RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS, RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS, AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 77 F.R.D. 507, 554 (1978) (proposed FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32(d) note).
56 Although a finding of manifest injustice tinder Rule 32(d) may not require
as strong a showing as a claim of deprivation of due process ... a motion
under Rule 32(d)s:losely resembles a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.... The defendant's burden in a Rule 32(d) motion, as in a § 2255
proceeding, is heavy.
Woodward v. United States, 426 F.2d 959, 964 (3d Cir. 1970). A showing of a due process
violation constitutes manifest injustice as a matter of law. See United States v. Crusco, 536
F.2d 21, 26 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277, 281 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 850 (1965). See generally Kienlen v. United States, 379 F.2d 20, 28 (10th
Cir. 1967); Gilinsky v. United States, 335 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1964). Some courts have
required facts that would constitute a due process violation before sustaining a claim of
manifest injustice:
A plea of guilty may not be withdrawn after sentence except to correct a "man-
ifest injustice," and we find it difficult to imagine how "manifest injustice" could
be shown except by proof that the plea was not voluntarily or understandingly
made, or a showing that defendant was ignorant of his right to counsel.
Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707, 709 (D.C. Cir.) (footnotes omitted), cert. de-
nied, 358 U.S. 847 (1958). See Note, supra note 53, 64 YALE L.J. at 590-91 n.4..
57 Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1946, a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea had to be made within 10 days after entry of the plea and before
sentence was imposed. See Note, vtpra note 54, at 379 n.92. Under rule 32(d), "there is
now no specific time limitation upon the withdrawal of a guilty plea where 'manifest injus-
tice' is shown." Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204, 209 n.3 (4th Cir. 1963). Judge,
now Justice, Stevens disagrees: "I would interpret Rule 32(d) as requiring timely applica-
tion, although some courts have apparently taken a different view.... This court has not
yet decided the timeliness issue under Rule 32(d) . United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d
521, 527 n.l (7th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
5" "[T]he delay is probative of the untruthfulness of defendant's allegations; presuma-
bly if they were true he would have acted with more dispatch . Note, supra note 54, at
380.
59 See 5 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 32:2, at 167
(1967).
'n In United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d (7th Cir. 1971), then Judge Stevens stated:
The reasons for narrowly limiting the grounds for collateral attack on final
judgments are well known and basic to our adversary system of justice. Every
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bringing the defendant to court,, and without holding a hearing,
"if the court is entirely familiar with the facts.""' Relief is limited
to withdrawal of the guilty plea."2 Because the granting of leave
to withdraw a plea is discretionary with the trial court, an appel-
late court will not interfere in the absence of an abuse of discre-
tion .133
Some courts have asserted that rule 32(d) affords a greater
chance for relief than 28 U.S.C. § 2255:
[T]he concept of "manifest injustice" under Rule 32(d) permits
the judge a greater latitude than the requirements of constitu-
tional "due process." ... The facts disclosed in a hearing might
not be sufficient for the court to conclude that the guilty plea
was involuntary and violative of due process, yet the court may
be of the opinion that clear injustice was done.6 4
On the other hand, the defendant's admission of guilt or even his
failure to assert innocence may in itself justify denial of the mo-
inroad on the concept of finality undermines confidence in the integrity of our
procedures; and, by increasing the volume of judicial work, inevitably delays
and impairs the orderly administration of justice. The impact is greatest when
new grounds for setting aside guilty pleas are approved because the vast major-
ity of criminal convictions result from such pleas.
Id. at 528-29 (dissenting opinion).
61 2 C.A. WRIGHT, supra note 55, § 537, at 465. Where a hearing is held, it must be
adversary, and the "burden is on the defendant to establish that he is entitled to relief." Id.
§ 539, at 477.
2 "Of course, the only relief available under Rule 32(d) is withdrawal of the guilty plea
and a trial after a plea of not guilty. On the other hand. the possible relief available under
28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 is more varied." Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204, 209 n.4
(4th Cir. 1963).
6" See Meyer v. United States, 424 F.2d 1181, 1191 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853
(1970). "[A) motion after sentence to withdraw a plea of guilty is addressed to the discre-
tion of the district judge, and ... his action thereon will be disturbed on appeal only for
abuse of discretion. This is so well established that citation of supporting authority is un-
necessary." Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 436, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
957 (1964). See Woodward v. United States, 426 F.2d 959, 964-65 (3d Cir. 1970); Note,
supra note 53, 64 YALE L.J. at 591.
64 Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204, 209 (4th Cir. 1963) (citations omitted).
Accord, 2 C.A. WRIGHT, supra note 55, § 539, at 476; Note, supra note 54, at 367 n.5. "The
manifest injustice standard for allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea under Rule 32(d) pro-
vides the district court with greater latitude or leeway than the standard under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 relating to vacation of judgment and sentence." Meyer v. United States, 424 F.2d
1181, 1190 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970). Accord, United States v. Smith, 440
F.2d 521, 525 n.10 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Kent, 397 F.2d 446, 448 n.1 (7th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1081 (1969). Nevertheless, some courts have treated § 2255
motions as rule 32(d) motions. See note 83 infra.
Moore argues that the scope of appellate review may be broader under § 2255 because
a rule 32(d) motion is addressed to the discretion of the district judge and can only be
reversed for an abuse of discretion. See 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 11.04[1], at 11-84
(2d ed. 1965).
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tion regardless of the circumstances under which the plea was
originally obtained. 65
B. 28 U.S.C. § 2255
A second avenue of collateral attack on a guilty-plea convic-
tion is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2255,66 which "substituted a new
collateral review procedure for the preexisting habeas corpus pro-
cedure." 67 Most courts permit a collateral attack on a plea con-viction under either section 2255 or rule 32(d)."8  Although the
literal language of section 2255 limits the remedy-the court may
"vacate, set aside or correct the sentence"-the Supreme Court
has construed the section to operate against defects in trial or plea
proceedings, as well as sentencing.6 :
11 See 2 C.A. WRIGHT, supra note 55, § 537, at 470-7 1. See generally 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRAcTlcE, supra note 64, 11.04[1], at 11-83; Note, supra note 53, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. at
208; Note, supra note 53, 64 YALE L.J. at 591 n.6.
11 Section 2255 states:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Con-
gress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that
the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence
was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to
collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set
aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show
that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to
be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon,
determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without
jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or other-
wise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringe-
ment of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment
vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside
and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or
correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the
production of the prisoner at the hearing.
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on
the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
17 Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 378 (1977).
68 "[Section] 2255 motions are frequently based upon grounds which can be raised by a
32(d) motion." Note, supra note 54, at 367 n.5. Some courts treat a 2255 motion challeng-
ing a plea conviction as a motion under rule 32(d). Sie note 83 infra.
69 [Legislative] history makes clear that § 2255 was intended to afford federal
prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus. ... Nowhere
in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon pris-
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Because a motion under section 2255 is characterized as a
"further step in the movant's criminal case rather than a separate
civil action,' 70 the movant is not required to pay a filing fee 71 tnd
may be able to effect discovery under both the Federal Rules of'
Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of' Civil Procedure.
7 2
However, a section 2255 proceeding is not "of necessity governed
by the legal principles which are applicable at a criminal trial re-
garding such matters as counsel, presence, confrontation, self-
incrimination, and burden of proof. 7 3
As with a rule 32(d) motion to withdraw a plea, the district
judge that accepted the plea and imposed sentence will generally
hear the motion for relief under section 2255 .7 Although sec-
tion 2255 requires the sentencing judge to hold a hearing "[u]n-
less the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief,"7 5 the Supreme
Court has recently noted procedures by which a district jldge can
avoid an evidentiary hearing,76 or even summarily dismiss the pe-
oners' rights of collateral attack upon their convictions.... [RIelief is available
on the ground that "[a person) is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States."
Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1974) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976))
(emphasis in original).
70 R. GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 1 note (Advisory Comm. Note).
71 See id. 3 note (Advisory Comm. Note).
72 See id. 6 note (Advisory Comm. Note).
3 Id. I note (Advisory Comm. Note).
74 See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 378 (1977). The Advisory Committee stated:
Commentators have been critical of having the motion decided by the trial
judge. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L.
Rev. 1038, 1206-1208 (1970)....
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that a judge other than
the trial judge should rule on the 2255 motion. See Halliday v. United States, 380
F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967).
R. GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 4 note.
75 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
76 [A]s is now expressly provided in the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases,
the district judge (or a magistrate to whom the case may be referred) may
employ a variety of measures in an effort to avoid the need for an evidentiary
hearing. Under Rule 6, a party may request and the judge may direct that
discovery take place, and "there may be instances in which discovery would be
appropriate [before an evidentiary hearing, and would show such a hearing] to
be unnecessary ...." Advisory Committee note to Rule 6, Rules Governing
Habeas Corpus Cases.... Under Rule 7, the judge can direct expansion of
the record to include any appropriate materials that "enable the judge to dis-
pose of some habeas petitions not dismissed on the pleadings, without the time
and expense required for an evidentiary hearing."
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 81-82 (1977) (discussing § 2254) (footnotes omitted).
Similar rules govern § 2255 proceedings. See R. GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 6, 7.
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tition.77 Where a hearing is required, section 2255 provides that
the prisoner need not be present. 7' Finally, although an appeal
as of right lies to the court of appeals from the final decision
denying the relief requested in a section 2255 motion, the indi-
gent movant is not entitled to assistance of counsel on appeal. 1
C. The Advantages qf a Direct Appeal
Direct appeal offers the plea-convicted defendant significant
advantages over collateral attack. A direct appeal is reviewed by a
three-judge panel of' the court of" appeals" which can overturn
the plea conviction on a finding of' error of less than constitu-
tional, jurisdictional, or findamental magnitude. "  The Supreme
77 "In some cases, the judge's recollection of the events at issue may enable him sum-
marily to dismiss a § 2255 motion .... Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 n.4 (1977).
The § 2255 rules permit the judge to dismiss the order "[i]f it plainly appears from the
face of the motion and any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the
movant is not entitled to relief." R. GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 4(b).
78 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976), quoted in note 66 supra.
79 See Note, Developments in the Law: Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1204
n.340 (1970).
'0 The petitioner employing collateral remedies is not only denied the initial judgment
of a three-judge panel of the court of appeals, but his petition may be dealt with, for the
most part, by a United States magistrate rather than a district judge:
Under this rule the duties imposed upon the judge of the district court by
rules 2 [motion], 3 [filing motion], 4 [preliminary consideration by judge], 6
[discovery], and 7 [expansion of the period] may be performed by a magistrate
if and to the extent he is empowered to do so by a rule of the district court.
R. GOVERNING § 2254 CASES 10 note (Advisory Comm. Note) (made applicable to § 2255 by
R. GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 10 note (Advisory Comm. Note)). The 1976 Federal
Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1976), permits magistrates to hold evidentiary
hearings in § 2255 proceedings, and to submit to the judge proposed findings and recom-
mendations for disposition.
81 Although some courts of appeals may sustain a rule 32(d) motion under a less strin-
gent standard than a § 2255 motion (see note 83 infra), it is not likely that the standard for
reversal on collateral attack will approach the leniency of the standard for reversal on
direct appeal:
[I]f a defendant can raise a Rule 11 violation by a § 2255 petition, the question
still remains whether the rigid rule requiring reversal for non-compliance with
Rule 11 applies for both direct and collateral review, or whether, on collateral
attack, the court may allow for more play in the joints in assessing the effects of
a Rule 11 violation. Without in any way detracting from the force of [McCarthy
v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969)] ... on direct appeal, we believe that ...
there must be flexibility in the collateral review of a Rule I 1 claim. The circuits
that have addressed this issue since [Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333
(1974)] have reached the same conclusion, and the standard for such review has
been variously phrased in terms of whether there was "manifest injustice," see
United States v. Watson, 548 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (reviewing a Rule 11
claim under Rule 32(d)); or a "'fundamental defect which inherently results in a
complete miscarriage of justice,' " see Bachner v. United States, 517 F.2d 589,
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Court has indicated that many claims which would have succeeded
on direct appeal will not succeed in a section 2255 proceeding:
"The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, 'will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.' ... For
this reason, non-constitutional claims that could have been raised
on appeal, but were not, may not be asserted in collateral pro-
ceedings.'8 2  Collateral relief tinder rule 32(d) is likely to be simi-
larly limited .1 3  Further, the indigent, plea-convicted defendant is
592-93 (7th Cir. 1975); McRae v. United States, 540 F.2d 943, 945 (8th Cir.
1976); United States v. Hamilton, 553 F.2d 63 at 65 (10th Cir. 1977) (all quoting
Davis v. United States, ... 417 U.S. at 346 ... ); or error "somewhat less serious
than constitutional error, and somewhat more serious than ordinary reversible
error," see Bachner, . .. 517 F.2d at 598 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Aviles
v. United States, [405 F. Supp. t,374, 1379-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)1; Poerio v. United
States, 405 F. Supp. 1258, 1262-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).8 Whatever the differences
among these standards, they share the requirement that a defendant must at
least show prejudice affecting the fairness of the proceedings or the voluntari-
ness of the plea in order to succeed in a collateral attack based upon a Rule 11
violation.
8 Although four circuits apparently reached contrary conclusions, see Bunker v.
Wise, 550 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Yazbeck, 524 F.2d 641 (lst
Cir. 1975); United States v. Wolak, 510 F.2d 164, 166 (6th Cir. 1975); Roberts v.
United States, 491 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1974), none of these cases discussed the
standard to be applied on collateral review, and Roberts was dcided before
Davis v. United States ....
Del Vecchio v. United States, 556 F.2d 106, 110-11 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1977). Accord, Keel v.
United States, 585 F.2d 110 (1978) (en banc). But see Timmreck v. United States, 577 F.2d
372 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 830 (1979). The Sixth Circuit held:
Admittedly McCarthy involved a direct appeal but if "prejudice inheres in a
failure to comply with Rule I 1," then it must be cognizable in a § 2255 proceed-
ing. We reconcile McCarthy and Davis by holding that a Rule 11 violation is per
se prejudicial and thus must be a "fundamental defect which inherently results
in a complete miscarriage of justice."
Id. at 377.
12 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 477 n.10 (1976) (quoting Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S.
174, 178 (1947)) (citation omitted).
This is not to say, however, that every asserted error of law can be raised
on a § 2255 motion. In Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429 (1962), for
example, we held that "collateral relief is not available when all that is shown is
a failure to comply with the formal requirements" of a rule of criminal proce-
dure in the absence of any indication that the defendant was prejudiced by the
asserted technical error. We suggested that the appropriate inquiry was
whether the claimed error of law was "a fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of justice," and whether "[iut ... present[s]
exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ
of habeas corpus is apparent." Id., at 428 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974).
83 Some courts of appeals, although permitting postconviction collateral attacks on plea
convictions under both rule 32(d) and § 2255, have treated the § 2255 motions as though
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entitled to the assistance of counsel 84 and transcripts of earlier
filed under rule 32(d). In United States v. Watson, 548 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the
defendant appealed the denial of a § 2255 motion that attacked a plea conviction on the
ground that the district judge did not fulfill all the rule 11 requirements in accepting the
plea. The court set forth two reasons for remanding the case for consideration under rule
32(d). First, the court stated that rule 32(d) provides "a special, and perhaps exclusive,
avenue of collateral challenge to an allegedly improper taking of a guilty plea." Id. at 1063.
Second, the court found that the explicit standard of rule 32(d) for determining whether
to permit withdrawal of the guilty plea-"to correct manifest injustice"-was "immune
from the shifting and still somewhat opaque judicial formulations differentiating between
direct appeals and 2255 motions." Id. at 1063-64. The court noted:
In his argument against limiting the scope of 2255 in relation to direct
appeal, appellant stresses the harshness that would ensue because of the short
period of time provided for taking a direct appeal in Rule 4, F.R.App.P. This is
undoubtedly a serious problem incident to any such differentiation. But it is
not a problem to the extent that Rule 32(d), and not 2255, is regarded as the
vehicle for collateral attack in the case of guilty pleas.
Id. at 1063 n.10. Three other courts of appeals have treated a § 2255 motion attacking a
plea conviction as a motion under rule 32(d). See Meyer v. United States, 424 F.2d 1181,
1190 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); United States v. Kent, 397 F.2d 446 (7th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1081 (1969); Kienlen v. United States, 379 F.2d 20, 23
(10th Cir. 1967).
One court of appeals found nothing to be gained by applying rule 32(d):
We recognize the recent decision in United States v. Watson .... Nothing is
to be gained by the invocation of Rule 32(d). Davis says that § 2255 may be
used when a § 2255 motion presents a defect which results in a miscarriage of
justice. We are convinced that there was no miscarriage of justice in the case at
bar.
United States v. Hamilton, 553 F.2d 63, 66 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
Moore maintains that the defendant would be better served by consideration under § 2255:
As a practical matter the scope of relief under Rule 32(d) is narrow since de-
fendant must ordinarily demonstrate his innocence of the charge in order to
withdraw the plea. Under section 2255, on the other hand, since inquiry is
directed to violation of fundamental rights, guilt or innocence should be ir-
relevant.
8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 64, 11.04[1], at 11-83 (footnotes omitted).
s1 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)
(indigent defendant not entitled to court-appointed counsel on discretionary appeal).
An indigent movant under § 2255 will receive assistance of counsel only if the judge
orders an evidentiary hearing: "If an evidentiary hearing is required, the judge shall ap-
point counsel for a movant who qualifies for the appointment of counsel under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(g) .... " R. GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 8(c). In ensuring counsel where an
evidentiary hearing is required, the Advisory Committee relied on reasoning equally
applicable where defendant, without counsel, prepares his initial motion: "Counsel can per-
form a valuable function benefiting both the court and the petitioner. The issues raised
can be more clearly identified if both sides have the benefit of trained legal personnel....
At a hearing, the petitioner's claims are more likely to be effectively and properly pre-
sented by counsel." R. GOVERNING § 2254 CASES 8 note (made applicable to § 2255 by R.
GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 8 note (Advisory Comm. Note)). Due process may require
appointment of counsel to aid indigent movants: "More recently, due process analysis has
been utilized to guarantee the right of appointed counsel in areas other than those clas-
sified as 'criminal'.... Some lower courts have found a due process right to appointed
counsel in a variety of ofher contexts including ... postconviction habeas corpus relief."
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proceedings 85 in preparing his brief only if he proceeds by direct
appeal. Finally, because the petitioner on direct appeal must act to
challenge his conviction within ten days after his sentencing, 6 he
is likely to better recollect the matters at issue.
The Supreme Court has noted the handicaps of the indigent,
trial-convicted defendant seeking postconviction collateral relief:
Applicants for relief under § 2255 must, if indigent, pre-
pare their petitions without the assistance of counsel.... Those
whose education has been limited and those, like petitioner,
who lack facility in the English language might have grave dif-
ficulty in making even a summary statement of points to be
raised on appeal. Moreover, they may not even be aware of
errors which occurred at trial.
8 7
Similarly, the plea-convicted defendant may not be aware of er-
rors at the plea and sentencing proceedings. Inability of the mov-
ant to speci.fy adequate grounds for relief will result in dismissal
of tie motion without a hearing. 8  Few postconviction motions
Note, Indigents' Right to Appointed Counsel in Interstate Extradition Proceedings, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 1039, 1057-58 (1976). The commentator noted that "the Supreme Court has avoided
analyzing the civil/criminal problem in the post-conviction relief area" (id. at 1066):
In ;mith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961), the Court stated: "While habeas
corpus may, of course, be found to be a civil action for procedural purposes ...
it does not follow that its availability in testing the State's right to detain an
indigent prisoner may be subject to the payment of a filing fee.... We shall
not quibble as to whether in this context it be called a civil or criminal action
for ... it is "the highest remedy in law, for any man that is imprisoned." ...
The availability of a procedure to regain liberty lost through criminal process
cannot be made contingent upon a choice of labels." Id. at 712. Yet it is pre-
cisely this "quibble" that may define the right to appointed counsel in postcon-
viction proceedings
(id. at 1066 n.158).
85 See United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976) (plurality opinion).
86 See FED. R. App. P. 4b.
87 Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 330 (1960). Most movants under § 2255
are indigent. See R. GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGs 3 note (Advisory Comm. Note).
88 "Most habeas petitions are dismissed before the pre-hearing conference stage." R.
GOVERNING § 2254 CASES 8 note (Advisory Comm. Note) (made applicable to § 2255 by R.
GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 8 note (Advisory Comm. Note)). Petitioner may not have
benefited from assistance of counsel:
[Slubdivision (a) [of Rule 6] provides that the judge should appoint counsel for
a petitioner who is without counsel and qualifies for appointment when this is
necessary for the proper utilization of discovery procedures. Rule 8 provides
for the appointment of counsel at the evidentiary hearing stage ... but this
would not assist the petitioner who seeks to utilize discovery to stave off dis-
missal of his petition ... or to demonstrate that an evidentiary hearing is
necessary.
Id. 6 note (Advisory Comm. Note) (made applicable to § 2255 by R. Governing § 2255
Proceedings 6 note (Advisory Comm. Note)).
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by federal prisoners receive an evidentiary hearing. 9  Although
the recent Supreme Court decision in Bound v. Smith,90 which
"requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation
and filing of" meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with
adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained
in the law,"' should aid prisoners in filing collateral attacks, these
benefits are not comparable to those provided on direct appeal.
III.
RULE 32(a)(2) OF THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Both the original proposal for rule 32(a)(2), enacted in 1966,
and the amendment, enacted in 1975, originated in the Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules of the Judicial Conference of the
United States. 2  The Advisory Committee sent the proposals to
the Conference's Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, which reported the final draft, including the Advisory
Committee Notes, to the full Judicial Conference. 3  The Judicial
Conference forwarded the proposals to the Supreme Court, which
prescribed them9 4 and reported them to Congress. 5  Both rule
32(a)(2) and the amendment went into effect as initially proposed
by the Advisory Committee.
'9 "Federal Courts fail to grant the relief requested in 96% of all prisoner cases.... In
fact, however, few cases receive an evidentiary hearing." Note, Rule 11 and Collateral Attack
on Guilty Pleas, 86 YALE L.J. 1395, 1415 n.74 (1977).
90 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
91 Id. at 828. For discussion of Bounds, see notes 149-169 and accompanying text infra.
92 See generally Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciamy, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1974) (statement of Judge Roszel C. Thomsen, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States) [hereinafter cited as
House Criminal Justice Hearings].
" See generally id. at 4.
'4 See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 416 U.S. 1001, 1014
(1974); Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts,
383 U.S. 1087, 1107 (1966). Although the Supreme Court may adopt "rules of practice
and procedure with respect to any or all proceedings after verdict ... or plea of guilty" (18
U.S.C. § 3772 (1976)) without reporting them to Congress, both rule 32(a)(2) and the 1975
amendment were reported to Congress. On the other hand, the Court must report to
Congress "rules of pleading, practice, and procedure with respect to any or all proceedings
prior to and including verdict ... or plea of guilty." Id. § 3771.
" See 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1976). Congress postponed the effective date of all proposed
1975 amendments until August 1, 1975 (see Act of July 30, 1974, 88 Stat. 397), and then,
on July 31, 1975, provided that the proposed amendments, except the amendment to rule
I l(e)(6), should take effect on December 1, 1975 (see Act of July 31, 1975, 89 Stat. 370).
See generally Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
905 (1976).
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A. The Purpose qf Rule 32(a)(2) as Enacted in 1966
Rule 37(a)(2), the predecessor of' rule 32(a)(2), stated: "When
a court after trial imposes sentence upon a defendant not rep-
resented by counsel, the defendant shall be advised of his right to
appeal and if he so requests, the clerk shall prepare and file
forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant."" Rule
32(a)(2), enacted in 1966, extended the duty of the court to advise
all trial-convicted defendants of the appropriate right to appeal:
After imposing sentence in a case which has gone to trial on a
plea of not guilty, the court shall advise the defendant of his
right to appeal and of the right of a person who is unable to
pay the cost of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma
pauperis. If the defendant so requests, the clerk of the court
FED. R. CRIM. P. 37(a)(2) (repealed 1966). The origin of present rule 32(a)(2) goes
beyond the enactment of rule 37(a)(2) in 1946. In 1940, the Supreme Court, pursuant to
authorizing legislation (see Act of June 29, 1940, 54 Stat. 688), appointed the Advisory
Committee on Rules in Criminal Cases. See Appointment of Advisory Committee on Rules
in Criminal Cases, 312 U.S. 717 (1940). In 1943, the Advisory Committee developed a first
preliminary draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which contained the follow-
ing provision: "When a court imposes sentence upon a defendant represented by counsel
appointed by the court or not represented by counsel, the court shall ask the defendant
whether he wishes to appeal." FED. R. CRINI. P. 35(a)(2) (Prelim. Draft 1943). The Advisory
Committee Note accompanying this rule stated:
The provision with respect to defendants not represented by counsel or
represented by assigned counsel is designed to eliminate any possible hardship
which might result in such cases because of the requirement that the appeals by
defendants be taken within 10 days. Compare Boykin v. Huff, 121 F.(2d) 865
(App. D.C., 1941).
Id. note. The rule and accompanying note did not distinguish between plea-convicted and
trial-convicted defendants.
In the second preliminary draft, rule 39(a)(2), the successor to rule 35(a)(2), reflected a
significant change: "When a court after trial imposes sentence upon a defendant not rep-
resented by counsel, the defendant shall be advised of his right to appeal and if he so re-
quests, the clerk shall prepare and file forthwith on behalf of the defendant a notice of
appeal." FED. R. CRIM. P. 39(a)(2) (Second Prelim. Draft 1944) (emphasis added). The
Advisory Committee Note accompanying rule 39(a)(2) did not discuss the rationale for
limiting the court's duty to contested cases, or for limiting the duty to cases where sentence
is imposed upon a defendant not represented by counsel. See id. note. One possible expla-
nation appears in a comment received by the Advisory Committee: "Judge W. Calvin
Chesnut, of the District of Maryland, objected to the provision, as to the judge's asking a
defendant whether he wishes to appeal. The rule should not apply to a defendant who
pleads guilty." 5 L. ORFIELD, supra note 59, § 37:3, at 539 (footnote omitted).
The Advisory Committee submitted the rules to the Supreme Court in 1944, and the
Court promulgated rule 39(a)(2), with the text unchanged, as rule 37(a)(2). See Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 323 U.S. 821 (1944). The rule went into effect in March 1946. See
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 327 U.S. 821 (1946).
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shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf of
the defendant.97
The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the rule pro-
vided the following justification for extending the judge's duty:
"[S]ituations arise in which a defendant represented by counsel at
the trial is not adequately advised by such counsel of his right to
appeal.19 8  The Committee advanced two reasons for this conclu-
sion. First, many trial counsel believe that their role ends with the
imposition of sentence.99  Second, the "defendant may be re-
moved from the courtroom immediately upon sentence and held
in custody tinder circumstances which make it difficult for counsel
to advise him."100  Because of the Committee's special concern
91 FED. R. GRIM. P. 32(a)(2) (amended 1975). The amended version is set forth in text
accompanying note 16 supra.
98 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2) note (1966 Advisory Comm. Note). The note states, in
pertinent part:
This amendment is a substantial revision and a relocation of the provision
originally found in Rule 37(a)(2): "When a court after trial imposes sentence
upon a defendant not represented by counsel, the defendant shall be advised of
his right to appeal and if he so requests, the clerk shall prepare and file forth-
with a notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant." The court is required to
advise the defendant of his right to appeal in all cases which have gone to trial
after plea of not guilty because situations arise in which a defendant rep-
resented by counsel at the trial is not adequately advised by such counsel of his
right to appeal. Trial counsel may not regard his responsibility as extending
beyond the time of imposition of sentence. The defendant may be removed
from the courtroom immediately upon sentence and held in custody under cir-
cumstances which make it difficult for counsel to advise him. See, e.g., Hodges v.
United States, 368 U.S. 139 (1961). Because indigent defendants are most likely
to be without effective assistance of counsel at this point in the proceedings, it is
also provided that defendants be notified of the right of a person without
funds to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
Id.
99 See id. "I have seen many claims of abandonment of counsel, retained and ap-
pointed, after the imposition of sentence." Letter from Robert Erdahl, Chief, Appellate
Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, to the Advisory Committee on Criminal
Rules, reprinted in [1963] Meetings and Comments 72(on file at Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.).
100 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2) note (1966 Advisory Comm. Note). This justification by the
Committee mirrors the concern voiced by the Supreme Court in Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962):
The salutary purpose of this provision [former rule 37(a)(2)] may, however, not
be achieved when the defendant appears at sentencing with counsel. If neither
counsel, whether retained or court appointed, nor the district judge imposing
sentence, notifies the defendant of the requirement for filing a prompt notice
of appeal, the right of appeal may irrevocably be lost.
Id. at 443 n.5. The Court released the Coppedge opinion on April 30, 1962, 27 days after
Professor Edward L. Barrett, Jr., then Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Criminal
Rules, had sent a memorandum to the Committee discussing this problem. See Memoran-
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that indigent defendants represented by court-appointed counsel
"are most likely to be without effective assistance of counsel at this
point in the proceedings," the rule required the judge to further
advise them of appeals in forma pauperis. 0'
The Advisory Committee Note never discussed the plight of
plea-convicted defendnts, indigent or otherwise. Professor Ed-
ward L. Barrett, then Reporter to the Committee, has stated that
in the early 1960's there was little reason to be concerned about
any right to direct appeal from a plea conviction.' 0 2 The Su-
preme Court's decision in McCarthy v. United States,'1 3 which dealt
with a direct appeal from a plea-conviction, did not come down
until 1969.
B. The 1975 Amendment to Rule 32(a)(2).
There shall be no duty on the court to advise the defendant .of
any right of appeal after sentence is imposed following a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere.' 0 4
This single sentence amendment clearly answers the question
left unresolved by rule 32(a)(2) as originally enacted. The judge
has no duty to advise plea-convicted defendants, indigent or
otherwise, of any right to appeal. Moreover, the amendment
never mentions or suggests the existence of the right to appeal a
plea conviction.
1. Congressional Commentary
The legislative commentary on the amendment consists of
only one sentence: "Proposed subdivision (a)(2) provides that the
court is not duty-bound to advise the defendant of a right to ap-
peal when the sentence is imposed following a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere."' 0' 5  This sentence simply paraphrases the first
dum from Edward L. Barrett to Chairman and Members of the Committee (Apr. 3, 1962)
(on file at Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.).
1I FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2) note (1966 Advisory Comm. Note). The Committee rejected
a proposal by Judge Walter Hoffman to provide trial-convicted defendants with a form
containing the information necessary to perfect an appeal, in lieu of notification by the
judge. See Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules (Oct. 14, 1963) (on file at
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.).
102 Telephone conversation with Professor Edward L. Barrett, Jr., University of Califor-
nia, Davis, School of Law (Feb. 14, 1978).
103 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
104 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2).
105 H.R. RP. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 674, 689.
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sentence of' the Advisory Committee Note accompanying the
amendment. No testimony addressed this amendment during the
House Judiciary Subcommittee Hearings on the package of' pro-
posed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. "
2. The Advisory Committee Note
The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the amendment
clearly indicates that the Committee intended not only to remove
the judge as a source of' appeal information to plea-convicted de-
fendants but also to denigrate even the concept of an appeal from
a plea conviction. 1 7  The note initially states that the purpose of
the amendment was "to make clear that there is no duty on the
court to advise the [plea-convicted] defendant of the right to ap-
peal." '  Judicial silence is the probable effect of' leaving such
notification to the discretion of' the trial judge. The Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure already impose a myriad of duties upon a
judge when accepting a guilty plea and sentencing the defendant.
106 See House Criminal Justice Hearings, supra note 92.
107 The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 1975 amendment to rule 32(a)(2)
states, in its entirety:
Subdivision (a)(2) is amended to make clear that there is no duty on the
court to advise the defendant of the right to appeal after sentence is imposed
following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
To require the court to advise the defendant of a right to appeal after a
plea of guilty, accepted pursuant to the increasingly stringent requirements of
rule 11, is likely to be confusing to the defendant. See American Bar Associa-
tion Standards Relating to Criminal Appeals § 2.1(b) (Approved Draft, 1970),
limiting the court's duty to advice [sic] to "contested cases."
The Advisory Committee is of the opinion that such advice, following a
sentence imposed after a plea of guilty, will merely tend to build false hopes
and encourage frivolous appeals, with the attendant expense to the defendant
or the taxpayers.
Former rule 32(a)(2) imposes a duty only upon conviction after "trial on a
plea of not guilty." The few federal cases dealing with the question have inter-
preted rule 32(a)(2) to say that the court has no duty to advise defendant of his
right to appeal after a conviction following a guilty plea. Burton v. United States,
307 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D. Ariz 1970); Alaway v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 326,
336 (C.D. Calif. 1968); Crow v. United States, 397 F.2d 284, 285 (10th Cir. 1968).
Prior to the 1966 amendment of rule 32, the court's duty was even more
limited. At that time the court's duty to advise was limited to those situations in
which sentence was imposed after trial upon a not guilty plea of a defendant
not represented by counsel. 8A J. Moore, Federal Practice 32.01[3] (2d ed.
Cipes 1969); C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 528 (1969);
5 L. Orfield, Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules § 32:11 (1967).
With respect to appeal in forma pauperis, see appellate rule 24.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2) note.
108 Id.
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It is highly unlikely that a judge would voluntarily provide further
information, in particular information that could ultimately re-
store the case to his crowded docket. 109
The second paragraph of the Advisory Committee Note
suggests that the judge would do a disservice to the defendant by
providing such information: "To require the court to advise the
defendant of a right to appeal after a plea of guilty, accepted
pursuant to the increasingly stringent requirements of rule 11, is
likely to be confusing to the defendant." 110  This conclusion
necessarily assumes that valid grounds for appeal from a plea
conviction do not exist. The many. Supreme Court decisions up-
holding challenges to plea convictions"' belie this assumption.
Although rule 11 requires the district judge, in accepting a
plea, to follow many procedures designed to insure a proper con-
viction,"1 2 federal plea convictions are not foolproof: "The objec-
109 "[C]rowded calendars throughout the Nation impose a constant pressure on our
judges to finish the business at hand." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516 n.35
(1973) (Stevens, J.).
110 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2) note (1974 Advisory Comm. Note).
I See notes 6-12 and accompanying text supra.
112 Rule 11 requires the judge to adhere to the following procedures prior to accepting a
guilty plea:
(c) Advice to Defendant.
Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the
defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he under-
stands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory
minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty
provided by law; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the
right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding
against him and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it
has already been made, and that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at
that trial has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to
incriminate himself; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further
trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere be waives the
right to a trial; and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask him
questions about the offense to which he has pleaded, and if he answers those
questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, his
answers may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false
statement.
(d) Insuring That the Plea Is Voluntary.
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by
addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is vol-
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tive of [rule 11], of course, is to flush out and resolve all such
issues, but like any procedural mechanism, its exercise is neither
always perfect nor uniformly invulnerable to subsequent challenge
calling for an opportunity to prove the allegations."'1 13  Further,
the Advisory Committee has created a false scenario of a judge in
one breath accepting the plea and in the next breath advising the
defendant how to undo the conviction.' 4  The plea and the sen-
tencing generally occur at two separate proceedings because rule
32(c) requires the preparation of a presentence report after the
plea and prior to sentencing." 5  Also misleading is the Commit-
tee's implication that grounds for appeal arise solely from the plea
proceedings. The sentencing proceeding itself may generate inter
alia the following grounds for appeal: refusal by the judge to
grant defense counsel's request to see the presentence report, 116
untary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea
agreement. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness to
plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the attorney
for the government and the defendant or his attorney.
(e) Plea Agreement Procedure.
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been reached by the
parties, the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement
in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea
is offered. Thereupon the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may
defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an
opportunity to consider the presentence report.
(3) Acceptance of a Plea Agreement. If the court accepts the plea agreement,
the court shall inform the defendant that it will embody in the judgment and
sentence the disposition provided for in the plea agreement.
(f) Determining Accuracy of Plea.
Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a
judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is
a factual basis for the plea.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
1"3 Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 215 (1973). Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63, 73 (1977), quoted Fontaine with approval.
"4 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2) note (1974 Advisory Comm. Note). The next paragraph of
the note correctly states that such advice would be provided "following a sentence imposed
after a plea of guilty" (id.), but does not indicate that the sentencing would occur at a
subsequent proceeding.
"' See FED. R. CGRIN. P. 32(c)(1)-(2). The court may forego the presentence report if the
defendant waives the report or if the extensive background information required by rule
32(c)-defendant's prior record, financial condition and other relevant data-is present in
the trial record. See id.
S16 "Before imposing sentence the court shall upon request permit the defendant, or his
counsel if he is so represented, to read the report of the presentence investigation .... " Id.
32(c)(3).
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refusal to permit allocution,' 17 or refusal to provide counsel to an
indigent defendant. 1 8 It is not valid to assume that fewer errors
will occur at proceedings to sentence plea-convicted defendants
than at those to sentence trial-convicted defendants.'19  Finally,
failure of the prosecution to adhere to the terms of the plea bar-
gain may not become apparent until the sentencing proceeding.
117 "Before imposing sentence, the court shall afford counsel an opportunity to speak on
behalf of the defendant .... " Id. 32(a)(1).
118 See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
119 Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides a method to correct or
reduce a sentence by filing a postsentence motion with the district judge:
The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the
reduction of sentence. The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after
the sentence is imposed, or within 120 days after receipt by the court of a
mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or
within 120 days after entry of any order or judgment of the Supreme Court
denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction.
The court may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of probation as pro-
vided by law.
A rule 35 motion is not the exclusive means for attacking a sentence. Errors cognizable
under rule 35, if apparent from the record, may be considered for the first time on direct
appeal from the final judgment of the district court. See United States v. Rosenbarger, 536
F.2d 715, 722 (6th Cir. 1976); 2 C.A. WRIGHT, supra note 55, § 583, at 563. See generally
Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 54 (1963); Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166
(1947). Both the sentence and the sentencing process are subject to review. See United
States v. Hoye, 548 F.2d 1271 (6th Cir. 1977) (direct appeal from guilty plea claiming
errors solely related to sentencing); United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 118-21 (D.C. Cir.
1976); United States v. Sheppard, 462 F.2d 279 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Weston,
448 F.2d 626, 631-34 (9th Cir. 1971). Some courts have said that the better practice is to
raise sentencing errors on direct appeal rather than in a subsequent rule 35 proceeding.
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 428 F.2d 1135, 1138 (2d Cir. 1970). Nevertheless, errors which
could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, can be raised on a subsequent rule
35 motion. See Popeko v. United States, 513 F.2d 771, 773 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Lopez, 428 F.2d 1135, 1138 (2d Cir. 1970). See generally Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S.
587, 589 n.3 (1961); United States v. Barash, 428 F.2d 328, 330-31 (2d Cir. 1970); United
States v. Sutton, 415 F. Supp. 1323, 1327 (D.D.C. 1976). In addition, errors previously
raised on direct appeal can be raised again on a subsequent rule 35 motion. See Popeko v.
United States, 513 F.2d 771, 773 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally United States v. Hoye, 548
F.2d 1271, 1273 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
United States v. Sheppard, 462 F.2d 279 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Where relief is denied on direct
appeal, however, a subsequent rule 35 motion would "have to carry a heavier burden of
proof as well as be tested by a narrower standard of review." United States v. Donner, 528
F.2d 276, 279 (7th Cir. 1976) (Justice Clark, retired, writing for a unanimous panel, includ-
ing Judge, now Justice, Stevens). Furthermore, it is significant that neither the Constitution
nor statute requires the appointment of counsel to assist in the preparation of a postappeal
rule 35 motion. Cf Burrell v. United States, 332 A.2d 344 (D.C. App.) (interpreting a
District of Columbia rule comparable to rule 35), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975).
Prior to the 1966 amendments to rule 35, some sentencing errors could only be rem-
edied on direct appeal. See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429 n.6 (1962). Even with
the amendments, a direct appeal may still constitute the exclusive means of reviewing cer-
tain errors committed at the sentencing stage. See, e.g., Whitfield v. United States, 410 F.2d
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Although the Advisory Committee branded judicial notifica-
tion of the right to direct appeal from a plea conviction as "likely
to be confusing to the defendant," it offered no justification for
its conclusion. If the defendant feels that his rights have been vio-
lated, he will, and indeed should, appeal. Thus, judicial advice
would be enlightening rather than confusing. 120 Furthermore, the
480, 482 (9th Cir. 1968) (rule 35 not applicable to suspension of sentence or granting of
probation).
Once notice of appeal is filed, the district court is without authority to entertain a rule
35 motion. See United States v. Allen, 510 F.2d 651, 654 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United
States v. Mack, 466 F.2d 333, 340 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 952 (1972); United
States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 542-43 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Dabney, 397 F.
Supp. 782, 783 (E.D. Pa. 1975); 8A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 64, 35.02[1].
See generally Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937); United States v. Dooley, 471
F.2d 570, 571 n.1 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Burns, 446 F.2d 896, 897 (9th Cir.
1971); Turner v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 581, 584 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1976).
The Advisory Committee has recently proposed a rule permitting a defendant,
whether convicted by trial or plea, to seek leave to appeal for a reduction of most sentences
of imprisonment:
(c) WHEN DEFENDANT MAY PETITION. A defendant may petition for
leave to appeal under subdivision (b) of this rule if sentenced to imprisonment,
unless:
(1) execution of the sentence isosuspended; or
(2) the sentence was part of a plea agreement accepted by the judge
and was no greater than the sentence which the attorney for the govern-
ment agreed to recommend or not to oppose under Rule 11(e)(1)(B) or
which was agreed to by the attorney for the government and the defendant
under Rule 11(e)(1)(C).
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE, PROPOSED RULE 35.1 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1976).
120 The Advisory Committee reads § 2.1(b) of the ABA Standards Relating to Criminal
Appeals as "limiting the court's duty to advice [sic] to 'contested cases."' FED. R. CRIM. P. 32
(a)(2) note (1974 Advisory Comm. Note). That section states: "It is appropriate for courts
imposing sentence in contested cases to assume the burden of advising the defendant that
he has the right of review, that it must be exercised within a specified time, and that he
should promptly consult counsel in that regard." ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL
APPEALS § 2.1(b) (Approved Draft 1970). The Committee has misinterpreted § 2.1(b) and,
also, taken it out of context. Section 2.1(b) does not impose a duty on the sentencing judge,
but merely states that it is "appropriate" for the judge to assume the burden of notification
in contested cases. Section 2.2 imposes a duty on defense counsel to advise all defendants
of the right to appeal:
(a) Trial counsel, whether retained or court-appointed, should continue to
represent a convicted defendant to advise on whether to take an appeal and, if
the appeal is sought, through the appeal ....
(b) Defense counsel ... should take itas his duty to advise a defendant on
the meaning of the court's judgment and his right to appeal ....
Id. § 2.2. Moreover, the ABA standards state clearly that there should be a right to appeal
a plea conviction: "A defendant should have the right to seek review of any final judgment
adverse to him, including.., a conviction based upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere."
Id. § 1.3(a)(iii). The Committee should have read § 2.1(b) in light of provisions setting forth
the existence of a right to appeal all convictions and the duty of counsel to advise all
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plea-convicted defendant could dispel any confusion by discussing
the matter with counsel.
The Advisory Committee also dismissed the prospect of' a
valid appeal from plea conviction: "[A]dvice [of the right to ap-
peal], following a sentence imposed after a plea of guilty, will
merely tend to build false hopes and encourage frivolous appeals,
with the attendant expense to the defendant or the tax-
payers." 121  The Committee set forth no evidence supporting this
conclusion 122 and ignored the many Supreme Court decisions
defendants of that right. See generally Erickson, The Finality of a Plea of Guilty, 48 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 835, 845 (1973).
The Committee also overlooked additional ABA standards that recognize a right to
appeal plea-convictions and impose a duty on the trial judge or defense counsel to advise
plea-convicted defendants of that right. Section 2.2(b) of the ABA Standards Relating to
the Appellate Review of Sentences states:
In all cases where a sentence is imposed after a guilty plea or the equiva-
lent, review of the sentence, as well as review of other matters which can be
raised, could appropriately be governed by a procedure patterned after the
following:
(i) Notice of appeal should be required of the defendant within [15]
days of the imposition of sentence. The court should advise the defendant
at the time of sentencing of his right to appeal and of the time limit, and
should at the same time afford him the opportunity to comply orally with
the notice requirement. It should be the responsibility of the attorney who
represented the defendant at the sentencing stage to advise him with re-
spect to the filing of the notice of appeal, and to assure that his rights in
this respect are protected.
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES § 2.2(b) (Approved Draft
1968). Section 8.2 of the ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function states:
(a) After conviction, the lawyer should explain to the defendant the mean-
ing and consequences of the court's judgment and his right of appeal. The
lawyer should give the defendant his professional judgment as to whether there
are meritorious grounds for appeal and as to the probable results of an appeal.
He should also explain to the defendant the advantages and disadvantages of
an appeal. The decision whether to appeal must be the defendant's own choice.
(b) The lawyer should take whatever steps are necessary to protect the de-
fendant's right to appeal.
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 8.2 (Approved Draft 1971).
121 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2) note (1974 Advisory Comm. Note).
122 See id. The Committee ignored Supreme Court decisions setting forth procedures by
which federal courts could protect themselves against frivolous appeals:
Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious
examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to
withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of
counsel's brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise
any points that he chooses; the court-not counsel-then proceeds, after a full
examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivo-
346
1979] APPEALS FROM FEDERAL PLEA CONVICTIONS 347
overturning plea convictions on various grounds. 28
The Advisory Committee's concern about "attendant expense
to the defendant or the taxpayers" appears to be directed primar-
ily to the costs of additional appeals and particularly to appeals by
indigents, who comprise forty-four percent of federal plea-
convicted defendants. 12 4  The Supreme Court has held that the
government must provide indigent appellants with assistance of
counsel 12'5 and necessary transcripts.126
In attempting to further justify this amendment, the Advisory
Committee noted that "[f]ormer Rule 32(a)(2) imposes a duty only
upon conviction" after trial.1 27  The Committee conveniently ig-
nored the fact that it had imposed that duty on judges in 1966
because trial counsel was not a reliable source of the vital informa-
tion. 128  The 1974 note never mentions the right to appeal a plea
conviction or the obligation of trial counsel to advise the defend-
ant of that right.12 9
lous. If it so finds it may grant counsel's request to withdraw and dismiss the
appeal.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). In his dissent in Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963), Justice Harlan wrote:
Although that decision [Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962) estab-
lished stringent restrictions on the power of federal courts to reject an applica-
tion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, it nonetheless recognized that the
federal courts could prevent the needless expenditure of public funds by sum-
marily disposing of frivolous appeals.
Id. at 366.
123 See notes 6-12 and accompanying text supra.
124 Statistics for the fiscal year 1976 furnished to the author by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts reveal that assigned counsel represented indigent defendants
in 15,042 (45%) of the 34,042 convictions entered by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
Letter from James A. McCafferty, Chief, Statistical Analysis and Reports Branch, Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts to Author (May 17, 1977) (copy on file at the
Cornell Law Review). This percentage is likely to increase on appeal because some defend-
ants able to retain counsel at the trial or plea level may find it necessary to seek leave to
appeal in forma pauperis.
125 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
126 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion).
127 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2) note (1974 Advisory Comm. Note).
121 See id. (1966 Advisory Comm. Note). The 1974 Advisory Committee Note stated that
the few federal cases interpreting rule 32(a)(2) found that "the court has no duty to advise
defendant of his right to appeal after conviction following a guilty plea." Id. (1974 Advi-
sory Comm. Note). None of the three pre-1971 cases cited by the Committee, however,
addressed the constitutionality of advising only one category of defendarits of the right to
appeal. Those decisions merely confirmed that the pre-1975 language of the rule required
the judge to advise only trial-convicted defendants.
129 The working papers of the Advisory Committee reveal that, despite the urging of
Committee Member Judge Walter Hoffman, Senior District Judge, E.D. Va., the Commit-
tee refused to take a stand on the following two issues: (1) the right vel non to appeal a
sentence imposed after a plea conviction, and (2) the duty vel non of the defense attorney
to advise a plea-convicted defendant of the right to appeal his sentence. With regard to the
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Thus, the literal language of the 1975 amendment, the si-
lence in the accompanying note with regard to the right to appeal,
antd the implication in the note that there can never be a valid
appeal from a plea conviction, are likely to mislead many to be-
lieve there is no right to appeal a plea conviction.
IV.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE RIGHT
TO DIRECT APPEAL FROM A PLEA CONVICTION
Three constitutional issues emerge from the foregoing discus-
sion of rule 32(a)(2) and the right to appeal a plea conviction: due
process, equal protection, and ineffective assistance of counsel.
A. Due Process
"Due process" emphasizes fairness between the State and the
individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other indi-
viduals in the same situation may be treated. 130
Under traditional due process analysis, the issue is whether
the effect of governmental conduct or a statute is "so arbitrary or
unreasonable, in the context of the particular appellate procedure ... as
to require ... invalidation." 131 Justice Harlan, dissenting in Grif-
fin v. Illinois 132 and Douglas v. California, 133 and writing for the
Court in Boddie v. Connecticut,134 developed a suitable framework
for due process analysis of an individual's ability to exercise his
right of access to court. In Griffin, the Court, on a combined due
first issue, Judge Hoffman referred to Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), and
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), as indicative of a right to appeal. With
regard to the second issue, Judge Hoffman preferred that the Committee specifically
eliminate the obligation of the attorney to advise the plea-convicted defendant of his right
to appeal. Absent adoption of this proposal, he urged that the Committee require the
sentencing judge to advise the plea-convicted defendant: "[U]nless we can protect the de-
fense attorney who ordinarily would never discuss any possibility of an appeal from a
guilty plea sentence, I would favor making it mandatory that the judge advise the defend-
ant of his right to appeal." Letter from Judge Walter Hoffman to Professor Frank L.
Remington, Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules (Apr. 20, 1970), at-
tached to Memorandum on Rule 32(a)(2) from the Reporter to the Committee (May 20,
1970) (on file at Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.).
'30 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974).
131 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 365 (1963) (dissenting opinion, Harlan, J.) (em-
phasis in original).
132 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion).
133 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
134 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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process-equal protection rationale, 135 ordered the state to provide
a transcript for an indigent defendant seeking to appeal. Justice
Harlan argued that due process protections apply only when an
appeal has been denied "for arbitrary or capricious reasons.' 36
He reasoned that denial of a transcript did not amount to denial
of an appeal. Dissenting in Douglas, which held, on grounds simi-
lar to Griffin, that the state must provide counsel to an indigent
on his first appeal as of right, Justice Harlan pointed out that
"even if counsel is denied, a full appeal on the merits is accorded
to the indigent appellant."'137 In both Griffin and Douglas, the de-
fendant could have pursued his appeal and, in Justice Harlan's
framework, had thereby been afforded due process. Focus on the
individual's access to the judicial process was central to the Court's
decision in Boddie v. Connecticut. Boddie held unconstitutional on
due process grounds a state fee procedure that denied "access to
its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their mar-
riages."' 38  Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan deemed this
situation more compelling than that of Griffin because the con-
sequence of not paying the fee was denial of access to court:
While in Griffin the transcript could be waived as a conve-
nient but not necessary predicate to court access, here the State
invariably imposes the costs as a measure of allocating its judi-
cial resources. Surely, then, the rationale of Griffin covers this
case.
... [T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires that these appellants be afforded an opportunity
to go into court to obtain a divorce .... '39
135 The precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas line of cases has never been
explicitly stated, some support being derived from the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that
Amendment. Neither Clause by itself provides an entirely satisfactory basis for
the result reached, each depending on a different inquiry which emphasizes
different factors.
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974) (footnote omitted).
136 351 U.S. at 37.
137 372 U.S. at 364.
138 401 U.S. at 374. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Court stated: "The
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of 'property,' however, has never been interpreted to
safeguard only the rights of undisputed ownership. Rather, it has been read broadly to
extend protection to 'any significant property interest,' . . . including statutory entitle-
ments." Id. at 86 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). The right to
direct appeal from a federal criminal conviction is a statutory entitlement. See note 14 and
accompanying text supra.
139 401 U.S. at 382.
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Dissenting in Boddie, Justice Black, author of the Grif.fin plu-
rality opinion, implies a stronger justification for finding a due
process violation when a criminal defendant is denied access to
court:
[I]n Griffin the Court studiously and carefully refrained from
saying one word or one sentence suggesting that the rule there
announced to control rights of criminal defendants would con-
trol in the quite different field of civil cases. And there are
strong reasons for distinguishing between the two types of
cases.
... [T]he United States Constitution has provided special
protections for people charged with crime.140
Thus under both Justice Harlan's ind Justice Black's analyses the
effective denial of a plea-convicted defendant's access to his ap-
peal as of right raises a substantial claim of unconstitutionality.
Recently, the Court in Ross v. Moffitt, 141 although rejecting the
petitioner's claim of entitlement to assistance of counsel in pro-
ceedings beyond the first appeal as of right, cited its opinion in
Douglas and Justice Harlan's dissent in reaffirming that meaning-
ful access to the appellate system requires a meaningful first ap-
peal.' 42
140 Id. at 390 (dissenting opinion, Black, J.). Two subsequent Supreme Court decisions
have upheld filing fee requirements in civil proceedings against due process and equal
protection claims asserted by indigents. In United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), the
Court upheld the fees required as a condition to a discharge in voluntary bankruptcy. The
Court limited Boddie to the following principle: "[A] state cannot deny access, simply be-
cause of one's poverty, to a 'judicial proceeding [that is] the only effective means of resolv-
ing the dispute at hand."' Id. at 443 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376
(1971)). The Court found: "Resort to the court... is not Kras' sole path to relief. Boddie's
emphasis on exclusivity finds no counterpart in the bankrupt's situation." Id. at 446. The
Court further stated: "The rational basis for the fee requirement is readily apparent." Id.
at 447.
In Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973), the Court upheld an Oregon appellate
court civil filing fee. The appellant had first appealed a county welfare agency decision to
the Oregon Public Welfare Division, which had conducted a hearing and upheld the
county agency's decision. The Court pointed out that Boddie was not concerned with post-
hearing review and held that "Kras, rather than Boddie, governs the present appeal." Id. at
659.
141 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
142 Id. at 611. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist found that the Griffin and Doug-
las line of cases drew support from both the due process clause and the equal protection
clause. In concluding that neither clause required the state to provide assistance of counsel
beyond the first appeal as of right, Justice Rehnquist noted a preference for equal protec-
tion analysis in considering whether the state had unfairly singled out indigents and denied
them "meaningful access to the appellate system because of their poverty."
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Although all of the aforementioned cases arose from claims
of indigent defendants, the requirement of fairness within the
criminal appellate process applies to all defendants. Thus, the crit-
ical issue for due process analysis is whether, in the following situ-
ations, the plea-convicted defendant, indigent or not, has been
unfairly denied access to his statutory right of first appeal.
1. The Judge Informs a Defendant Erroneously That a Guilty Plea
Waives the Right to Appeal
Twenty-six percent of the federal district judges responding
to the author's survey inform a defendant that a guilty plea waives
the right to appeal. 143  This advice is erroneous. In so misleading
a defendant, the judge has acted unfairly. If this misinformation
causes a plea-convicted defendant to lose his right to direct ap-
peal, he is denied due process.' 4 4 A court could fashion appro-
priate relief by creating a new, ten-day period within which the
plea-convicted defendant could perfect a direct appeal or apply
for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. 145
2. The Judge Does Not Inform a Plea-Convicted Defendant of the
Right to Appeal
Eighty-five percent of the federal district judges responding
to the author's survey indicated that, at sentencing, they do not
advise a plea-convicted defendant of any right to appeal. 146  This
telling silence is consistent with the language of rule 32(a)(2),
which states that there is no duty to so advise. Assuming, as the
Advisory Committee did in 1966,147 that defense counsel cannot
be relied upon to advise of the right to appeal, and recognizing
that the Criminal Justice Act plans direct court-appointed counsel
143 See Appendix.
144 Fundamental fairness, as a concept of due process of law, requires when an ac-
cused has entered a plea of guilty based upon a promise by a judge who thereaf-
ter, whatever the reason, fails to adhere to his promise, that the judge on his own
motion, reinstate the not guilty plea and reinvest the defendant with the funda-
mental rights accorded him under our accusatory system of justice.
United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (footnote
omitted).
145 In an analogous situation, where the trial judge had erroneously failed to advise a
trial-convicted defendant of his right to appeal, the Supreme Court ordered the judgment
reversed and remanded the case "to the District Court where petitioner should be resen-
tenced so that he may perfect an appeal in the manner prescribed by the applicable rules."
Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 332 (1969).
146 See Appendix.
147 FED. R. CRIzt. P. 32(a)(2) note (1966 Advisory Comm. Note).
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to so advise only trial-convicted defendants,'1 48 plea-convicted de-
fendants are likely to remain uninformed of their right to appeal.
The Supreme Court has recently held, on grounds broader
than due process, that, when a government establishes a criminal
appellate process, there is a fundamental constitutional right of
access to that process. In Bounds v. Smith, 149 the Court interpreted
this right to require state prison authorities "to assist inmates in
the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by provid-
ing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance
from persons trained in the law." 150 The Court rebuffed a chal-
lenge to Younger v. Gilmore, 151 its cryptic, per curiam affirmance of
a three-judge district court decision. 152  The district court in
Younger had required California to provide indigent prisoners
"adequate means of obtaining the legal expertise necessary to ob-
tain" 153 access to the courts. In reaffirming Younger, the Court in
Bounds relied primarily upon its decisions in Johnson v. Avery 154
and Wolff v. McDonnell.155  Those cases had invalidated state reg-
ulations that prevented inmates from receiving legal assistance
from fellow inmates. In Wolff, the Court had tied the right of
access to the courts to the due process clause: "The right of access
to the courts, upon which Avery was premised, is founded in the
Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the
opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning vio-
lations of fundamental constitutional rights." 156
148 See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
149 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
150 Id. at 828 (footnote omitted).
151 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
152 Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Younger
v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971). The Court stated: "Having heard the case on its merits, we
... affirm the judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of California. Johnson
v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969)." 404 U.S. at 15.
153 319 F. Supp. at 112. Access to the courts, said the district court, "encompasses all the
means a defendant or petitioner might require to get a fair hearing from the judiciary on all
charges brought dgainst him or grievances alleged by him." Id. at 110.
154 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
155 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
"'I Id. at 579. Justice Douglas, concurring in Johnson v. Avery, quoted Hatfield v. Bailleaux,
290 F.2d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 1961): "'Reasonable access to the courts is ... a right [secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States], being guaranteed as against state action by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment .... ' 393 U.S. at 498 n.24 (brackets in
original). Bounds found support in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), which had
"invalidated [state] regulations barring law students and paraprofessionals employed by
lawyers representing prisoners from seeing inmate clients." 430 U.S. at 824 n. 11. Procunier
had held: "The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the require-
ment that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convic-
tions .... 416 U.S. at 419.
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The duties imposed on the state by Bounds, Younger, Johnson
and Wolff extend to all inmates regardless of' their financial
status.157  Furthermore, although Bounds involved collateral pro-
ceedings, the Court indicated that the "fundamental constitutional
right of access to the courts" 158 also guarantees access to direct
appeals: "[R]ecent decisions have struck down restrictions and
required remedial measures to insure that inmate access to the
courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful. Thus, in order to
prevent 'effectively foreclosed access,' indigent prisoners must be
allowed to file appeals ... without payment of docket fees." 159
As authority, Justice Marshall cited Burns v. Ohio, 160 which
employed the combined due process-equal protection rationale of
Griffin v. Illinois.' 161
Bounds also drew support from Griffin and Douglas v. Califor-
nia.162  Justice Marshall stated:
Because we recognized that "adequate and effective appellate
review" is impossible without a trial transcript or adequate sub-
stitute, we held that States must provide trial records to inmates
unable to buy them. Giffin v. Illinois.... Similarly, counsel must
be appointed to give indigent inmates "a meaningful appeal"
from their convictions. Douglas v. California. 163
157 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 n.17 (1977).
158 Id. at 822.
159 Id. (quoting Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959)).
160 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
161 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion), discussed in text accompanying note 132 supra.
"[A]s Griffin holds, once the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it
may not foreclose indigents from access ...." Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. at 257. This is one of
several citations in Bounds to cases decided on grounds broader than due process. For exam-
ple, Bounds cites Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961), which struck down a docket fee
requirement barring indigent prisoners from filing habeas corpus petitions. 430 U.S. at 822.
The Court decided Smith on equal protection grounds: "We hold that to interpose any finan-
cial consideration between an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right
to sue for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws." 365 U.S. at
709. Bounds also referred to Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942), where, on equal protec-
tion grounds, the Court had enjoined state interference with inmate access to the courts. 430
U.S. at 822.
162 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
163 430 U.S. at- 822-23 (citations omitted). The Court was concerned with the importance
of providing assistance in original actions, which necessarily include the first appeal as of
right:
[I]n this case, we are concerned in large part with original actions seeking new
trials, release from confinement, or vindication of fundamental civil rights....
The need for new legal research or advice to make a meaningful initial presen-
tation to a trial court ... is far greater than is required to file an adequate
petition for discretionary review.
Id. at 827-28. Justice Rehnquist did not agree with the Court's categorization of these
claims as original actions and argued that under Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), these
defendants were not entitled to assistance:
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Although this statement from Bounds implies that Griffin and
Douglas guarantee these benefits only to imprisoned indigents,
both cases clearly set forth a duty owing to all indigent de-
fendants. 164
Bounds also relied upon Ross v. Moflitt,'1 5 which had reaf-
firmed that assistance of counsel was an integral component of
meaningful access to the courts for all indigent defendants pursu-
ing their first appeal as of right: "And even as it rejected a claim
that indigent defendants have a constitutional right to appointed
counsel for discretionary appeals, the [Ross] Court reaffirmed that
States must 'assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportu-
nity, to present his claims fairly.' ... '[M]eaningful access' to the
courts is the touchstone." 166
Although BounLs held that North Carolina- must provide a
library or legal assistance to prisoners, the opinion does not limit
the fundamental constitutional right of access to the criminal
postconviction process to imprisoned or indigent defendants.
Bounds indicates that the fundamental right exists for the benefit
of every convicted defendant and that, where necessary, the gov-
ernment must act to ensure meaningful, postconviction access to
the courts. 167  Direct appeal, the most advantageous federal post-
conviction remedy, is lost if notice of appeal is not filed within ten
The prisoners here in question have all pursued all avenues of direct appeal
available to them ....
... It would seem, afortiori, to follow from [Ross v. Moffitt] that an incar-
cerated prisoner who has pursued all his avenues of direct review would have
no constitutional right whatever to state appointed counsel to represent him in
a collateral attack on his conviction, and none of our cases has ever suggested
that a prisoner would have such a right.... Yet this is the logical destination of
the Court's reasoning today.
Id. at 839-41 (dissenting opinion).
"' In Griffin, Justice Black stated for the plurality: "Destitute defendants must be af-
forded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy tran-
scripts." 351 U.S. at 19. In Douglas, Justice Douglas framed the issue as "whether, or not an
indigent shall be denied the assistance of counsel on appeal." 372 U.S. at 355.
1-65 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
16' Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. at 823 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974))
(citation omitted).
117 That Justice Marshall, author of the Bounds opinion, would not favor limiting the
availability of this right to the indigent or imprisoned is evident from his dissenting opin-
ion in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973):
It is true that Griffin and Douglas also involved discrimination against indi-
gents, that is, wealth discrimination. But, as the majority points out ... the
Court has never deemed wealth discrimination alone to be sufficient to require
strict judicial scrutiny; rather, such review of wealth classifications has been
applied only where the discrimination affects an important individual interest
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days after sentencing. Paper, pen, library, and even the potential
assistance of' counsel proposed by the Supreme Court in Younger
v. Gilmore and Bounds v. Smith, 168 are of no use in filing a direct
appealoif the ten-day period has passed. If the sentencing judge is
the sole effective source of information about the right to appeal,
as the Advisory Committee concluded in 1966,169 a strong argu-
ment can be made that Bounds requires that the judge ensure the
opportunity for access to direct appeal by advising the plea-
convicted defendant of that right.
3. The Deftndant Is Misled by Rule 32(a)(2)
Rule 32(a)(2) and the Advisory Committee Note accompany-
ing the 1975 amendment do not deny the existence of a right to
direct appeal from a plea conviction. Nevertheless, they are likely
to mislead the plea-convicted defendant or his counsel to believe
that there is no right to appeal.
Although every defendant sentenced in federal district court
is entitled to an appeal, this right is not plainly stated by any fed-
eral provision.17 0  Rule 32(a)(2) is the sole federal provision to
distinguish between trial convictions and plea convictions. 7 One
might well assume that, if the right to appeal a plea conviction did
exist, evidence of that right would appear in the rule or in the
accompanying note. Yet none of the bodies responsible for the
rule-the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and
.... Thus, I believe Griffin and Douglas can only be understood as premised on a
recognition of the fundamental importance of the criminal appellate process.
Id. at 102 n.61 (emphasis added).
168 It is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense with
paper and pen to draft legal documents, with notarial services to authenticate
them, and with stamps to mail them. States must forgo collection of docket fees
otherwise payable to the treasury and expend funds for transcripts. State ex-
penditures are necessary to pay lawyers for indigent defendants at trial,
and in appeals as of right ....
430 U.S. at 824-25. Although dissenting from the requirement that states provide assis-
tance to inmates seeking collateral remedies, Chief Justice Burger strongly reaffirmed the
importance of access to courts for direct appeals from criminal convictions:
[T]he access to the courts which these respondents are seeking is not for the
purpose of direct appellate review of their criminal convictions. Abundant ac-
cess for such purposes has been guaranteed by our prior decisions ....
[Clonstitutional principles of due process and equal protection form the basis
for the requirement that States expend resources in support of a convicted
defendant's right to appeal.
Id. at 834.
'69 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2) note (1966 Advisory Comm. Note).
'o See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra.
'7 See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
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Congress-redrafted the original proposal or amended the note
to verify the right to appeal a plea conviction. 72
The rule directs the sentencing judge to inform all trial-
convicted defendants of the appropriate right of appeal, arid then
emphatically denies the existence of any similar obligation to
plea-convicted defendants. 73  The Advisory Committee Note ac-
companying the 1975 amendment fails to mention the duty of
defense counsel to inform the defendant of his right to appeal,
and belittles the concept of appeal from a plea conviction as
frivolous and wasteful. 1 74
Twenty-six percent of the federal district court judges re-
sponding to the author's survey erroneously inform a defendant
that a guilty plea waives the right to appeal. 75  Although no evi-
dence establishes that rule 32(a)(2) induces this misadvice, no
other federal provision provides any basis for the error. The rule
is likely to confuse plea-convicted defendants and defense coun-
sel. 176 If a reasonable reading of rule 32(a)(2) causes a plea-
172 For discussion of the process of promulgation of rule 32(a)(2), see notes 92-95 and
accompanying text supra. Because "the deliberations of the Advisory Committee, which
makes the basic decisions, are private ... [and it] holds no public hearings" (Weinstein,
supa note 95, at 908-09 (footnote omitted)), it is unfortunate that the Advisory Committee
Note does not include concurring or dissenting opinions of Committee members. Publica-
tion of the 1975 amendment accompanied by a note totally supportive of the proposal
provides the misleading appearance of unanimous support for both the rule and the note's
analysis.
Inclusion in the note of Judge Walter Hoffman's view that if defense counsel had a
duty to advise their clients of a right to appeal, then that same information should be
provided by the court (see note 129 supra), would have highlighted the fact that the pro-
posed amendment did not address itself to either the right to appeal or the unjustified
reliance on defense counsel to advise plea-convicted defendants of that right. Had the
Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure, the Supreme Court, or Congress been
made aware of this, there might have been a change in the amendment or the addition of
commentary addressing those matters. Professor Howard Lesnick raised this problem in
the 1974 House hearings: "[N]o disclosure is made of any division within the Advisory
Committee, Standing Committee or Conference itself, which might alert interested lawyers
and legislators that matters of controversy are being resolved." House Criminal Justice Hear-
ings, supra note 92, at 205 (statement of Professor Howard Lesnick, University of Pennsyl-
vania Law School).
173 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2).
174 See id. note (1974 Advisory Comm. Note).
175 See Appendix.
176 Professor Frank Remington, Reporter to the Committee during the period when the
amendment was drafted, has stated that there was no intention to mislead judges, defense
counsel or plea-convicted defendants to believe that there is no right to appeal a plea
conviction. The issue, however, is not the intention of the Committee but the impact of the
rule.
After being informed of the results of the author's survey, Professor Remington stated
that if the Committee had the opportunity to redo its work, he would recommend that it
carefully spell out in the notes the obligation of defense counsel to inform his plea-
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convicted defendant who is unadvised of' his rights by the court to
forego his direct appeal, 177 then the government has denied him
due process of' law.1 78
convicted client of the right to appeal. Professor Remington would also seek to develop a
procedure to make counsel aware of his responsibility. Finally, Professor Remington would
seek to develop a procedure whereby the sentencing judge would advise the plea-convicted
defendant of his right to attack his sentence under rule 35. Telephone conversation with
Professor Frank Remington, University of Wisconsin Law School (Feb. 14, 1978).
177 Both the experience of the plea-convicted defendant at his sentencing, and his sub-
sequent contact with sentenced, trial-convicted defendants are likely to foster the belief that
he does not possess the right to direct appeal, or if indigent, the right to seek leave to
appeal in forma pauperis. Multiple defendants from various trial and plea convictions are
often present in the courtroom at a time designated by the judge for sentencing proceed-
ings. The plea-convicted defendant is likely to notice that the judge has informed only
trial-convicted defendants of the right to appeal. Even if the plea-convicted defendant is
not present in the courtroom for the sentencing of others, he is likely to hear from trial-
convicted defendants at the lockup, on the bus to prison, or in prison, that the judge had
informed them of the right to appeal. Finally, if the imprisoned, plea-convicted defendant
seeks to ascertain his rights under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, he will likely
read rule 32(a)(2), which reinforces the belief that only trial-convicted defendants have a
right to appeal. The plea-convicted defendant could logically conclude that if he had a
right to direct appeal, the judge would have so advised him.
17' Although both rule 32(a)(2) and the 1975 amendment were prescribed by the Su-
preme Court (see note 94 and accompanying text supra) and enacted without change by
Congress (see note 95 and accompanying text supra), they remain open to constitutional
attack: "The fact that this Court promulgated the rules as formulated and recommended
by the Advisory Committee does not foreclose consideration of their validity, meaning or
consistency." Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphee, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946). Accord,
United States v. Carden, 428 F.2d 1116, 1117 (8th Cir. 1970). See Goldberg, The Supreme
Court, Congress, and Rules of Evidence, 5 SETON HALL L. REv. 667, 679 n.70 (1974); Lesnick,
The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Reexamination, 61 A.B.A.J. 579 (1975).
On the other hand, it should not be presumed that the Court would view a federal
rule as a complete stranger:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing
the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice: the court
has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if
the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prina facie
judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enab-
ling Act nor constitutional restrictions.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
Lower courts, however, might confer on federal rules an implied presumption of
constitutionality:
The Court must approach the challenge to the Bankruptcy Rule with the
history of the rules in mind. The rules were adopted by the Supreme Court of
the United States after long and careful study not only by the Court, but by
panels of outstanding attorneys and citizens expert in the field. They were then
submitted to the Congress for review, and only after such review did they be-
come effective. There is a strong presumption that the Supreme Court did not
abridge or modify any substantive right by the rules. There is also a strong
presumption that, had the Court so overstepped the authority delegated by the
Congress, such transgression would have been noted and the offending rule
modified or deleted upon review.
In re Wall, 403 F. Supp. 357, 360 (E.D. Ark. 1975) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
The Fifth Circuit has stated: "The fact that the rule [FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a)-(b) (amended
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B. Equal Protection
'Equal protection' ... emphasizes disparity in treatment by a
State between classes of individuals whose situations are argu-
ably indistinguishable. 17 9
The requirement that the federal government provide equal
protection of the law to its citizens is implicit in the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. 180 Although the federal govern-
ment need not provide a right to appeal from a criminal convic-
1966)] was approved and proposed by the Supreme Court also supplies it with an armor of
great, but not complete, invincibility." Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir.
1947). It is unlikely that a lower federal court will declare a federal rule unconstitutional:
"[O]nly the Supreme Court which, acting purstiant to section 30 of the Bankruptcy Act (11
USCA § 53), prescribed the geheral order should declare it unlawful. We certainly cannot
with propriety hold General Orders promulgated by the Supreme Court unlawful." In re
Bronx Ice Cream Co,, 66 1V.2d 620, 624 (2d Cir. 1933) (A. Hand, L. Hand, Chase, JJ,).
Accord, Harris v, Zloh's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 127 F.2d 1012, 1015 (10th Cir. 1942). See
Weinstein, supra note 95, at 935. Although one district court limited the effect of a federal
rule of criminal procedure on constitutional grounds (see United States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp.
603 (D. Ore. 1947) (construing rule 20)), that decision has not been followed (see Hilder-
brand v. United States, 304 F.2d 716, 717 (10th Cir. 1962); Earnest v. United States, 198
F.2d 561, 562 (6th Cir. 1952); United States v. Gallagher, 183 F.2d 342, 345 (3d Cir.
1950); Levine v. United States, 182 F.2d 556, 558 (8th Cir. 1950)).
It is questionable whither the rules prescribed by the Court deserve any presumption
of constitutionality"
[Tlhis court does not write the Rules, nor supervise their writing, nor appraise
them on their merits, weighing the pros and cons. The Court concededly is a
mere conduit. Those who write the Rules are members of a Committee named
by the Judicial Conference. The members are eminent; but they are the sole
judges of the merits of the proposed Rules, our approval being merely per-
functory. In other words, we are merely the conduit to Congress. Yet the public
assumes that tur imprimatur is on the Rules, as of course it is.
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 184, 185 (1972)
(dissenting ;pinion, Douglas, J.). See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, 416 U.S. 1001, 1003 (1974) (dissenting opinion, Douglas, J.); Amendments to Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, 406 U.S. 979, 981 (1972) (dissenting opinion, Douglas,
J.); Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts, 383
U.S. 1089, 1089 (1966) (dissenting opinion, Douglas, J.); Amendments to Rules of Civil
Procedure for the United States District Courts, 374 U.S. 865, 865 (1963) (separate state-
ment, Black and Douglas, JJ.). See generally Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme
Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 685 (1975). One solution would be to
remove the rulemaking function from the Supreme Court: "Transfer of the function to
the Judicial Conference would relieve us of the embarrassment of having to sit in judg-
ment on the constitutionality of rules which we have approved and which as applied in
given situations might have to be declared invalid." Amendments to Rules of Civil Proce-
dure for the United States District Courts, 374 U.S. at 870 (separate statement, Black and
Douglas, JJ.). Accord, Lesnick, supra, at 582; Weinstein, supra note 95, at 962. Contra, Moore
& Bendix, Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9, 38 (1974).
179 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974).
'so See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
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tion, having done so, the appellate process must be "free of un-
reasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access
to the courts." 181
Rule 32(a)(2) divides convicted defendants into two classes:
trial-convicted and plea-convicted. By requiring the court to give
notice of the right to appeal to the former, but not to the latter
class, the rule discriminates on its face against plea-convicted de-
fendants.1 82 By rendering it less likely that plea-convicted
defendants will learn of their right to appeal, rule 32(a)(2) inter-
feres with the exercise of that right. In evaluating differential
treatment against the requirement of equal protection, the Court
has employed three levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and the rational basis test.
Strict scrutiny is ordinarily applied if the "classification im-
permissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right," 183 e.g., the rights to trayel,' 18 4 bear children,'85 or partici-
pate on an equal level in a state-created electoral process; 186 "or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class," 187 e.g.,
race.188 Under strict scrutiny, a legislative classification is invalid
absent a showing that it is necessary to accomplish a compelling
,8, Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966), quoted with approval in Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974).
182 If rule 32(a)(2) were neutral on its face, an equal protection challenge would require
a showing that the rule was intended to discriminate. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 240-48 (1976). It could be argued, however, that because rule 32(a)(2) does not
forbid informing the plea-convicted defendant of his right to appeal, it is neutral as to
those defendants. This argument wholly fails to deal with the rule's explicit discrimination
in establishing a duty to advise trial-convicted defendants and not establishing a duty to
advise plea-convicted defendants. Even if this argument is accepted, however, the note to
the 1975 amendment clearly shows the Committee's determination to grant knowledge of
the right to appeal to trial-convicted defendants and deny it to plea-convicted defendants,
and even explains the reason for this discrimination. See notes 107-29 and accompanying
text supra. This is clearly sufficient to show discriminatory purpose under the tests
suggested by the Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977).
's3 Massachusetts Bd. of Educ. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1975).
184 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
,' See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Cf Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978) (right to marry); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy encompassing
right to terminate pregnancy).
186 See American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972).
,87 Massachusetts Bd. of Educ. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1975).
'88 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). Cf Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (ancestry).
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governmental interest. 18 9 Few' classifications survive this intensive
scrutiny.190
Although there is no constitutional right to vote in state elec-
tions, and although voters have not been designated a suspect
class, the Court has applied the strict scrutiny test to classifications
impinging on the fundamental right of equal access to the elec-
toral process.' 9 ' The Court has held that once an electoral pro-
cess is adopted by a state there is an implicit "constitutionally pro-
tected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other
citizens in the jurisdiction." 192 Similarly, Congress has created an
appellate process and the Supreme Court appears to have recog-
nized a fundamental right of access to that process' 93  By anal-
ogy to the right to vote decisions, one would argue that rule
32(a)(2) denies equal protection of the law to plea-convicted de-
fendants by providing notice of the right to appeal only to trial-
convicted defendants and thus impeding knowledge of and use of
the appellate process by plea-convicted defendants. 94
Although the Court might refuse to apply the strict scrutiny
test to a challenge brought by a class composed of all plea-
convicted defendants, it is not likely to resort to the minimum
15' See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969).
190 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1000 (1978); Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
19 See, e.g., American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972).
1'92 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.74 (1973)
(quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)) (emphasis added by Court). See id.
at 59 n.2 (concurring opinion, Stewart, J.). The principal voting rights cases discussed in
Rodriguez were Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) and Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
'9 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-28 (1977); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
607-15 (1974).
194 Douglas v. California and Griffin v. Illinois may not support the use of strict scrutiny in
analyzing rule 32(a)(2). Those cases emphasized the invidious character of wealth classifica-
tions in the context of criminal procedure. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-58
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-19 (1956) (plurality opinion). Professor Gunther
has made the following assessment:
[T]he presence of the fundamental interest [in participation in the electoral
process) triggered strict scrutiny whether or not economic distinctions were
present: It served to invalidate not only poll taxes and fee barriers to ballot
access but also restrictions turning on party allegiance and length of residence,
for example. The thrust of the Griffin-Douglas principles, by contrast, has been
more limited. Intense scrutiny has been exercised only where the interest in
access to the criminal process was combined with differential economic impacts.
G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 820 (9th ed. 1975).
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scrutiny approach-the rational basis test.19 5  The Court, without
labeling it as such, has developed an intermediate level of scrutiny
in recent years: "'Though the latitude given state economic and
social regulation is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifi-
cations approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this
Court exercises a stricter scrutiny .... , This level of scrutiny
has been applied either openly or implicitly to classes based on
gender 197 or illegitimacy,1 98 cases involving receipt of important
governmental benefits such as food stamps,199 or cases involving
substantial deprivations of rights such as commitment to a state
mental institution.2 0 0
A strong argument can be made for invoking the inter-
mediate scrutiny test in examining the claim of an unadvised,
plea-convicted defendant who has lost his right to appeal. Appel-
,9- Although the rule affects the class composed of all plea-convicted defendants, there
is some basis for arguing that the impact is more severe on the subclass composed of
indigent, plea-convicted defendants. This suggests that more intense scrutiny should be
used in evaluating equal protection claims raised by such defendants.
The 1966 Advisory Committee Note accompanying rule 32(a)(2) stated that indigent,
trial-convicted defendants "are most likely to be without effective assistance of counsel at
this point in the proceedings" (FED. R. CRINM. P. 32(a)(2) note), and thereby are at the
greatest disadvantage in seeking to perfect a direct appeal. There is no reason to assume
that counsel representing an indigent, plea-convicted defendant will outperform counsel
for an indigent, trial-convicted defendant.
The indigent, plea-convicted defendant is also at a disadvantage in comparison with
the nonindigent, plea-convicted defendant. The nonindigent can perfect an appeal after
learning of the right to appeal, but the indigent must become aware of both the right to
appeal and the right to apply for leave to appeal informa pauperis. This explains why rule
32(a)(2) requires the sentencing judge to advise the trial-convicted defendant not only of
his right to appeal, but also of "the right of a person who is unable to pay the cost of an
appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis" Id. 32(a)(2). Further, to deny to
indigent, plea-convicted defendants information vital to the exercise of the right to appeal
undermines the Griffin-Douglas line of decisions, which held that the Constitution requires
the government to provide counsel and transcript(s) to assist indigents on their first ap-
peals as of right. See notes 135-137 and accompanying text supra. Nevertheless, this dis-
criminatory impact upon indigents is not likely, without more, to sustain an equal protection
claim. "Proof of... discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Auth., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
196 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972)). See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1976) (concur-
ring opinion, Powell, J.); Gunther, supra note 190, at 20; Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 42 n.226 (1977).
197 See, e.g., California v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
'98 See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S.
628 (1974); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
,' See, e.g., Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973).
200 See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (invalidating provisions for pretrial
commitment of incompetent criminal defendants).
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late review is an integral part of the federal criminal justice sys-
tem. 20 1  Two recent Supreme Court opinions have reaffirmed the
importance of direct appeal. In Ross v. Moffitt, 20 2 the Court re-
jected petitioner's claim to counsel for a second discretionary ap-
peal, but, in reaffirming the right to assistance of counsel on first
appeal, stressed the importance of meaningful access to the crimi-
nal appellate process. 20 3  In United States v. MacCollom,20 4 the
Court refused to hold that government must provide every de-
fendant with a free transcript of earlier proceedings for a collat-
eral attack, but stressed that respondent had foregone his oppor-
tunity for direct appeal and attendant free transcript. 0 5 Because
both cases appear to ascribe near-fundamental importance to di-
rect appeal within the criminal appellate process, intermediate
scrutiny would be warranted for analysis of equal protection
claims raised by a class composed of plea-convicted defendants.
Although the Supreme Court has failed to articulate the na-
ture of inquiry called for by intermediate review, Professor Lau-
rence Tribe has catalogued five general techniques employed by
the Court: (1) the challenged classification must serve "important"
although not necessarily "compelling" governmental interests;
(2) the means selected by the government must be substantially
related to the achievement of its objectives; (3) the government
must articulate a valid current rationale for the classification-the
Court will not supply a rationale from judicial imagination or
legislative history; (4) the language, structure and legislative his-
tory of the rule must clearly indicate the objective of the
classification -the objective cannot be the product of after-
thought; and (5) in place of striking down the challenged rule,
the court will alter it to permit rebuttal in individual cases.206
Application of these five intermediate scrutiny techniques to
rule 32(a)(2) is likely to uncover a denial of equal protection. Of
the various rationales proffered by the Advisory Committee for
201 See generally Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977). In Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956), one of the major considerations in requiring a state to furnish a tran-
script to an indigent criminal appellant was the fact that "[a]ppellate review has now be-
come an integral part of the Illinois trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or inno-
cence of a defendant." Id. at 18 (plurality opinion). This same consideration influenced the
decision of the Court in requiring states to provide counsel for an indigent on his first
appeal of right. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
202 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
203 Id. at 612-15.
204 426 U.S. 317 (1976) (plurality opinion).
05 See id. at 325-26.
206 L. TaBE, supra note 186, at § 16-30.
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the 1975 amendment to rule 32(a)(2), only the husbanding of
prosecutorial and judicial resources could constitute an "impor-
tant" governmental interest. Yet, even as to this goal, the legisla-
tive means fails the test of substantial relation. Singling out the
class of plea-convicted defendants and effectively ensuring that
they remain ignorant of their statutory rights is not reasonably, let
alone substantially, related to the goal of conserving state re-
sources.
If the class composed of plea-convicted defendants is denied
the advantages of strict or intermediate scrutiny, the equal protec-
tion analysis must proceed under the rational basis test: whether
there is "some rationality in the nature of the class singled
out."''7 The Supreme Court has been reluctant to hold that chal-
lenged legislation has no rational, legitimate basis. Furthermore,
the Court has held that the complainant challenging the practice
or rule tinder the rational basis test has the burden of proving
that the test has not been met.20 Several arguments can be ad-
vanced in favor of sustaining rule 32(a)(2). None, however, is per-
suasive.
First, the government may argue that the length and com-
plexity of a trial creates a greater potential for error than does a
plea proceeding. But the greater potential for error at trial does
not mean that there is no potential for error at a plea proceeding
or the subsequent sentencing. Nor is there any basis for conclud-
ing that the right to appeal from a trial containing multiple errors
merits greater protection than the right to appeal from a plea
proceeding containing one error. A plea of guilty does not compel
the conclusion that the defendant must endure, without challenge,
an unconstitutional or otherwise improper conviction or sentence.
Second, the government may argue that it would confuse the
defendant, who has previously confessed guilt to the court, for
the judge to inform -him of a right to appeal. It is unlikely that a
plea-convicted defendant would be confused by this information if
the government has not carried out its obligations under the plea
bargain, if the judge has not sentenced him properly, or if some
other error has occurred. Even if judicial notification of the right
to appeal may in some instances confuse the plea-corfvicted de-
fendant, his confusion, easily dispelled by consulting his lawyer, is
preferable to his remaining ignorant of the right to appeal.
"07 Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 ('966), quoted with approval in Fuller v. Ore-
gon, 417 U.S. 40, 49 (1974).
2"8 See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
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Third, the government may argue that advising plea-
convicted defendants of the right to appeal is likely to add to the
number of appeals, in particular the number of frivolous appeals,
and increase the expenses of the federal criminal justice system.
The plea-convicted defendant has little to lose in appealing. If he
succeeds, on remand he can generally proceed to trial on that
same charge, 209 and if convicted, he is generally protected against
the imposition of a more severe sentence. a° Further, the indi-
gent, plea-convicted defendant can proceed on appeal without any
personal expenditure of funds; he is entitled to free counsel and
transcripts.
Althotigh increasing the number of appeals is likely to in-
crease the number of frivolous appeals, and although there is a
greater opportunity for error at a trial than at a plea proceeding,
there is no rational basis for assuming that more frivolous appeals
will arise from plea convictions than from trial convictions. 211 The
Supreme Court has held that a generalized fear of frivolous ap-
peals cannot justify a governmental procedure that denies the
right of appeal to a class of defendants. In Rinaldi v. Yeager,212 the
Supreme Court rejected, on equal protection grounds, a gov-
ernmental procedure requiring prisoners who had taken an un-
successful appeal to reimburse the state for the cost of furnishing
a trial transcript. The court pointed out that:
[a]part from its fiscal objective, the only other purpose of
this law advanced by the appellees is the deterrence of frivolous
appeals. Assuming a law enacted to perform that function to be
otherwise valid, the present statutory classification is no less
vulnerable under the Equal Protection Clause when viewed in
relation to that function. By imposing a financial obligation
only upon inmates of institutions, the statute inevitably burdens
many whose appeals, though unsuccessful, were not frivolous,
209 But see Borman, The Chilled Right to Appeal From A Plea Conviction: A Due Process Cure,
69 Nw. L. REv. 663 (1975). "The general view in remanding a vacated 'offense bargain'
plea conviction to one or some of several offenses is that the prosecutor may reinstate all of
the original charges and may choose whether to again offer the bargain." Id. at 711.
210 See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-26 (1969).
211 If adopted, the assumption may violate equal protection:
Thus, for all that is shown in this record, the two subclasses ... stand on equal
footing, and the potential for spurious claims is the same as to both; hence to
conclusively deny one subclass benefits presumptively available to the other de-
nies the former the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the due process
provision of the Fifth Amendment'
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974).
212 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
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and leaves untouched many whose appeals may have been
frivolous indeed.21
3
Thus, the generalized fear of frivolous litigation if' plea-convicted
defendants were informed of the right to appeal does not provide
a rational basis for rule 32(a)(2). Moreover, the Court has held
that the party alleging frivolity has the burden of showing abuse
of the right to appeal. 214  The number of' legitimate reasons for
appealing a plea conviction should prevent the government from
sustaining its burden. This is not to disparage attempts to reduce
the number of frivolous appeals within the criminal justice system.
Rule 32(a)(2), however, is not a rational means of' accomplishing
this goal.
Thus, although the equal protection claim envisaged in this
discussion appears to deserve more intense scrutiny than the ra-
tional basis test, the rule is not likely to survive even that
minimum test.
V.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Failure of' defense counsel properly to advise an otherwise
unadvised, plea-convicted defendant of' the right to appeal pro-
vides a colorable sixth amendment claim of' ineffective assistance
of' counsel. In Mempa v. Rhay,2 5 the Supreme Court extended the
right to assistance of' counsel to sentencing proceedings. The
Court noted the role of' counsel in protecting the right to appeal
of' that plea-convicted defendant:
213 Id. at 310. The Court in Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962), stated:
"Indigents' appeals from criminal convictions cannot be used as a convenient valve for
reducing the pressures of work on the courts. If there are those who insist on pursuing
frivolous litigation, the courts are not powerless to dismiss or otherwise discourage it." Id.
at 450.
Rinaldi did not turn on the fact that the state statute had required indigents to bear
part of the cost of unsuccessful appeals, but rather on the fact that the statute discrimi-
nated unreasonably against a particular class of indigents-prisoners. 384 U.S. at 307-08.
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 n.11 (1969). The Court's decisions in Dowd v.
United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951), and Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255
(1942), also protected prisoners' rights on equal protection grounds. Those cases struck
down rules permitting prison officials to suppress appeals papers and thus prevent prison-
ers from properly filing direct appeals.
214 "Since our statutes and rules make an appeal in a criminal case a matter of right, the
burden of showing that that right has been abused through the prosecution of frivolous
litigation should, at all times, be on the party making the suggestion of frivolity." Cop-
pedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 447-48 (1962).
213 38g U.S. 128 (1967).
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[C]ertain legal rights may be lost if not exercised at this stage.
For one, Washington law provides that an appeal in a case in-
volving a plea of guilty followed by probation can only be taken
after sentence is imposed folloving revocation of probation....
[A]bsence of counsel ... might well result in loss of the right to
appeal. While ordinarily appeals from a plea of guilty are less
frequent than those following a trial on the merits, the inci-
dence of improperly obtained guilty pleas is not so slight as to
be capable of being characterized as de minimis. 216
Mempa has established that counsel still has a role to play
after sentence has been pronounced. If "absence of counsel ...
might well result in loss of the right to appeal, 21 7 then the duty
of counsel is to protect his client's right of appeal by notifying him
of that right, and, where appeal is desired, filing the necessary
papers within the ten-day period. 2t8 Failure to carry out these
obligations should result in a determination of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel -assistance below "the range of competence de-
manded of attorneys in criminal cases. 2 19
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue,
several courts of appeals have held that failure of counsel to in-
form trial-convicted defendants of the right to appeal amounts to
ineffective assistance of counsel.22 0  By contrast, the Fifth Cir-
-1 Id. at 135-36 (footnotes omitted)(citation omitted).
217 Id. at 136. "Cases are accumulating, mainly through post-conviction litigation, where
defendants have been substantially abandoned by their lawyers at the conclusion of the
trial proceedings so that the defendants lost the opportunity in normal course to have
appellate review." ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS § 2.2 note a (Ap-
proved Draft 1970).
21' The Federal Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1976), provides indigent
federal defendants with assistance of counsel "through appeal."
219 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
220 See United States v. Neff, 525 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1975) (dictum); Goodwin v.
Cardwell, 432 F.2d 521, 522 (6th Cir. 1970); Nelson v. Peyton, 415 F.2d 1154, 1156-57
(4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1007 (1970); Wynn v. Page, 369 F.2d 930, 932 (10th
Cir. 1966); Dillane v. United States, 350 F.2d 732, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits find a denial of effective assistance of counsel
when court-appointed counsel fails to advise an indigent, trial-convicted defendant of the
right to appeal. See, e.g., Bonds v. Wainwright, 579 F.2d 317, 319 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc);
Shiflett v. Virginia, 447 F.2d 50, 53-54 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 994
(1972); United States ex rel. O'Brien v. Maroney, 423 F.2d 865, 868 (3d Cir. 1970).
The Second Circuit has avoided the need to inquire into the competence of assigned
or retained counsel during the postsentencing period by holding, in a case involving an
indigent, trial-convicted defendant, that the Constitution requires the state to advise every
defendant of the right to appeal:
We think the only practical, logical and fair interpretation to be given to
Douglas v. California is that it imposes upon the state a duty to warn every
person convicted of crime of his right to appeal and his right to prosecute his
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cuit 2 21 and several district courts2 2 2 have held that failure of
appeal without expense to him by counsel appointed by the state, if he is indi-
gent. The right to appeal at the expense of the state is mere illusion if the
convicted indigent defendant does not know such a right exists. And the one
way to make sure that he does know is to tell him so.
7
... [Tihis will result in an unequivocal statement by the trial judge or by
counsel for the convicted defendant sufficiently comprehensive to be applicable
to indigents and non-indigents as well. This ... serves the purpose of cutting
off future applications of the same nature, as a convicted defendant is unlikely
successfully to assert that no such instructions were given by the trial judge or
by his counsel in the face of a court record showing the instructions were given,
or a written communication to the same effect from the lawyer to the de-
fendant.
United States ex rel. Smith v. McMann, 417 F.2d 648, 654 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1969) (en banc)
(emphasis added), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1970). Although this language does not re-
strict the state's duty to trial-convicted defendants, a subsequent decision of the Second
Circuit indicates that the court would not extend the McMann holding for the benefit of
plea-convicted defendants:
[Ilt is a large step to apply the rationale of these [trial] decisions to convictions
based upon the admission in open court by a defendant represented by counsel
that he did commit the crime charged. How sizeable the step would be is indi-
cated by the recent proposal of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure of the Judicial Conference of the United States that there "be no duty on
the court to advise the defendant of any right to appeal after sentence is im-
posed following a plea of guilty."
United States ex rel. Roldan v. Follette, 450 F.2d 514, 516 (2d Cir. 1971).
The Seventh Circuit, in a case arising from a trial conviction, has held that Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1962), impose a
constitutional duty on the trial judge to inform an indigent defendant of the right to ap-
peal: "The right to appeal is ineffectual if a defendant is ignorant of this right, and we
find it incumbent on the trial judge to inform indigent defendants of this right." United
States ex rel. Singleton v. Woods, 440 F.2d 835, 836 (7th Cir. 1971).
221 See Williams v. United States, 443 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (affirming
on appended opinion of district court). The district court summarily dismissed petitioners
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: "Petitioner complains that his counsel did not
inform him of his right to appeal. There is no necessity to advise a defendant of any right
to appeal after a guilty plea." Id. at 1153-54. The district court relied upon Boyes v. United
States, 354 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1965) and Dillane v. United States, 350 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir.
1965). Boyes held that rule 37(a)(2), the predecessor to rule 32(a)(2), did not require the
court to inform a plea-convicted defendant of any right to appeal. 354 F.2d at 32. Dillane
did not deal with an appeal from a plea conviction and, in fact, lends support to the
proposition that failure to advise a defendant of his right to appeal constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel:
In the record before us there appear to be allegations that appellant's counsel,
retained for his defense at the trial, never apprised him of his right to file a
notice of appeal .... If true, and if unexplained, this impresses us as such an
extraordinary inattention to a client's interests as to amount to ineffective assis-
tance of counsel cognizable under Section 2255.
350 F.2d at 733 (footnote omitted). Subsequent Fifth Circuit decisions have found ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel when counsel has failed to advise trial-convicted defendants of
their right to appeal. See Arrastia v. United States, 455 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1972); Powers v.
United States, 446 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1971).
222 See Farrington v. North Carolina, 391 F. Supp. 714, 716 (M.D.N.C. 1975). Younger
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counsel to so advise plea-convicted defendants does not support a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. None of the latter cases
has considered the constitutionality of advising only one class of
convicted defendants; several of them have relied on the language
of rule 32(a)(2).223
There is no justification for limiting this constitutional protec-
tion to trial-convicted defendants. If counsel fails to notify any
defendant of his right to appeal, a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel should be sustained. The remedy employed on finding
ineffective assistance of counsel has been vacatur of judgment and
resentencing of the defendant, thereby creating a new period dur-
ing which defendant can exercise his right to appeal. 224
VI.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the sentencing proceeding marks the beginning of
the brief, ten-day period for filing notice of appeal,225 only the
trial-convicted defendant is assured of being informed of the right
to appeal. Further, the language of rule 32(a)(2) and the 1974
Advisory Committee Note could mislead the judge, defense coun-
sel and the plea-convicted defendant to believe that there is no
right to appeal a plea conviction. Various constitutional rights of
the plea-convicted defendant may have been violated by the mis-
information or lack of information provided by judges and de-
fense counsel, and the misleading language of rule 32(a)(2).
Adoption of the following proposals would facilitate early resolu-
v. Cox, 323 F. Supp. 412, 416-17 (W.D. Va. 1971); Burton v. United States, 307 F. Supp.
448, 450 (D. Ariz. 1970).
223 It is, then, the opinion of the court that there is no constitutional duty, in all
instances, for either the trial judge or the defense attorney to advise the defend-
ant of his right to appeal after a plea of guilty.... The Supreme Court, in its
rule making capacity, has not seen fit in F.R.Cr.P. 32 to require district judges to
advise defendants of a right to appeal after a plea of guilty, although the advice
is required after a not guilty plea.
Younger v. Cox, 323 F. Supp. 412, 416 (W.D. Va. 1971) (emphasis in original). Accord,
Burton v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D. Ariz. 1970).
224 In Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969), discussed in note 145 supra, the
Court used this remedy after a trial judge failed to advise an indigent, trial-convicted de-
fendant of his right to appeal. See also Dillane v. United States, 350 F.2d 732, 733 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
22 See FED. R. AP. P. 4b.
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tion by direct appeal of all claims against the plea-conviction or
sentence.2 26  Further, adoption of these proposals would cure the
constitutional defects inherent in the present notification proce-
dure.
1. Inform Federal Judges That There is a Right to Appeal a Plea
Conviction
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts should
immediately move to correct misconceptions about rule 32(a)(2). A
letter should be circulated to all federal judges setting forth the
ample judicial authority demonstrating the existence of the right
to direct appeal from a plea conviction and stating that rule
32(a)(2) does not undermine that right. The letter should also
explain the constitutional ramifications of' neither the judge nor
defense counsel properly advising the plea-convicted defendant of'
the right to appeal. Dissemination of this letter should eliminate
the practice of the many federal district court judges who advise
defendants erroneously that a guilty plea waives the right to ap-
peal. 2 The letter may also induce judges to advise plea-
convicted defendants of their right to appeal or to make sure that
defense counsel performs this function.
226 The longer the delay, the less the reliability of the determination of any factual
issue giving rise to the attack.... Inability to try the prisoner is even more
likely in the case of collateral attack on convictions after guilty pleas, since there
will be no transcript of testimony of witnesses who are no longer available.
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.
142, 147 (1970) (footnotes omitted). The Advisory Committee has stated in regard to
habeas corpus proceedings:
The assertion of stale claims is a problem which is not likely to decrease in
frequency.... The grounds most often troublesome to the courts are ineffec-
tive counsel, denial of right of appeal, [and] plea of guilty unlawfully induced
.... When they are asserted after the passage of many years, both the attorney
for the defendant and the state have difficulty in ascertaining what the facts
are.... The court reporter's notes may have been lost or destroyed, thus
eliminating any exact record of what transpired. If the case was decided on a
guilty plea, even if the record is intact, it may not satisfactorily reveal the extent
of the defense attorney's efforts in behalf of the petitioner....
The interest of both the petitioner and the government can best be served
if claims are raised while the evidence is still fresh.
R. GOVERNING § 2254 CASES 9 note (Advisory Comm. Note) (made applicable to § 2255 by
R. GOVERNING § 2255 PROCEEDINGS 9 note (Advisory Comm. Note)). Use of direct appeal
may lessen the number of collateral petitions: "There may be some offsetting relief in a
decrease in the number of prisoner petitions as the questions raised 'by those petitions
come to be more fully litigated on direct review." Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts
of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542,
548 n.35 (1969).
227 See' Appendix.
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2. Ensure that Defense Counsel Fulfills the Obligation to Inform
Plea-Convicted Defendants of the Right to Appeal
Should .the judge fail to advise the plea-convicted defendant
of his right to appeal, defense counsel is obligated to do so. If
counsel does not fulfill this obligation, he risks a later claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Because defense counsel may not
be aware either of the plea-convicted defendant's right to appeal
or counsel's obligation to so advise him, the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts should develop a procedure to ensure
that counsel provide effective assistance. Specifically, each defend-
ant should be required to sign a form acknowledging to the court
that counsel had notified him of his right to appeal within ten
days after sentence and indicating his desire to exercise or waive
that right. Counsel should also be required to sign the form ver-
ifying that he had provided the aforementioned information. In
addition, the Administrative Office should recommend to the
chief judges of each circuit and each district that all Criminal Jus-
tice Act plans be amended to inform assigned counsel of their
obligation to advise plea-convicted defendants of the right of ap-
peal.
3. Amend Rule 32(a)(2)
The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules should im-
mediately -begin to revise rule 32(a)(2). The revision should not
merely correct the misleading implications of the rule but should
require the judge to inform plea-convicted defendants of their
right to direct appeal.228 The following proposed revision would
accomplish this.
(2) Notification of Right to Appeal. After imposing sentence in a
case which has gone to trial or after a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to
appeal and the, right of an individual who is unable to pay the
cost of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma
pauperis. If the defendant so requests, the clerk of the court
shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf of
the defendant.
This proposal would protect the constitutional right of access to
the criminal appellate process. Further, the proposal would elimi-
nate most post-conviction challenges based on misadvice or lack of
advice by the court or counsel.
228 Moore has proposed expanding the notification required under rule 32(a)(2) to
plea-convicted defendants because of the many grounds upon which to challenge the sen-
tencing proceeding. See 8A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 64, 32.06, at 32-102.
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VII.
A FINAL COMMENT-THE NEED TO RESTRUCTURE FEDERAL
PROCEDURES FOR POSTCONVICTION REVIEW
Direct appeal is presently the most advantageous route for
challenging a federal conviction or sentence. Appellant benefits
from review by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals, and
the potential for reversal on a showing of error of less than con-
stitutional, jurisdictional, or fundamental magnitude. The indi-
gent appellant is entitled to both court-appointed counsel and
necessary transcripts. These benefits outweigh the sole advantage
of collateral remedies 2 29-the immediate consideration by the dis-
trict judge against whom the challenge is directed.2 30
Although the advantages of direct appeal should induce a
properly advised defendant to channel his postconviction chal-
lenge into direct appeal, the court of appeals may not be the most
effective forum to deal with many claims. If many of the principal
benefits provided by direct appeal were provided on collateral
postconviction challenges directed to the district judge, numerous
claims could be resolved fairly at the district court level with sig-
nificant savings in time and money. For example, if a defendant
asserts that the judge, in accepting his plea, did not comply with
rule 11, he Would file a rule 32(d) motion to withdraw the plea.
The judge would then read the transcript of the plea proceeding,
and resolve the claim either by denying the motion or by permit-
ting withdrawal of the plea. Currently, an indigent defendant
would be foolish to proceed collaterally because he would not be
entitled to assistance of counsel and necessary transcripts. Further,
any defendant who proceeds collaterally and then seeks to appeal
from an unfavorable district court decision does not receive the
more advantageous standard of review provided on direct appeal.
On direct appeal, a defendant would have his plea conviction va-
cated if the transcript of the plea proceeding revealed that the
judge did not comply with rule 11. On appeal from a district
court's denial of a postconviction collateral motion to vacate a plea
setting forth the same rule 11 grounds, courts of appeals will gen-
erally uphold the conviction because that error will not be deemed
of fundamental or constitutional magnitude.2 3'
229 The principal collateral remedies are rules 32(d) and 35 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
230 For discussion of the advantages of direct appeal over collateral proceedings, see
notes 80-91 and accompanying text supra.
231 See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
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The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be revised
to provide many of the benefits of direct appeal to defendants
who, within ten days after sentencing, file notice of an intention
to challenge their convictions or sentences at the district court
level. The following proposal would provide a more rational pro-
cedure for reviewing federal postconviction claims. The sentenc-
ing judge should inform the defendant of his right to postconvic-
tion review. The court should provide the defendant with a form
outlining the alternatives-proceeding to the district court with a
right to subsequent appeal or taking an immediate direct
appeal-and the ten-day time limit. The form should be reviewed
by the defendant with the assistance of counsel; both should sign
the form indicating whether defendant wishes to pursue a post-
conviction challenge and, if so, the manner in which he will pro-
ceed. If defendant chooses to proceed with district court review,
he would be guaranteed all of the benefits of direct appeal except
initial review by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals. In
place of this latter benefit, he would receive immediate considera-
tion by the district judge with an opportunity to appeal that deci-
sion to the court of appeals. It is likely that many challenges to
plea convictions under rule 11 would be finally resolved at the
district court level. If defendant appeals the district court deci-
sion, the court of appeals would employ the standard of review
for a direct appeal rather than an abuse-of-discretion standard.
In conclusion, the Advisory Committee should begin work on
three tasks. First, it should redraft rule 32(a)(2) to clarify the right
to appeal from a plea conviction. Second, it should recommend to
the chief judges of each circuit and each district revisions to the
Criminal Justice Act plans. Third, it should develop a more ra-
tional and efficient plan for postconviction review of federal crim-
inal convictions which would encourage the use of collateral pro-
cedures without penalizing defendants for failing to proceed by
direct appeal.
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APPENDIX
In May 1977, the author conducted a brief two-question sur-
vey of all federal district court judges and senior federal district
court judges.
The survey included a brief cover letter setting out rule
32(a)(2) and a stamped, self-addressed postcard bearing the fol-
lowing two questions:
1. At sentencing do you advise a defendant who
has plead guilty of a right to appeal, or if indi-
gent of the right to apply for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis?
Yes_ No__
2. If your answer to #1 was No, prior to accepting
a guilty plea, do you advise the defendant that
pleading guilty waives the right to direct appeal?
Yes__ No__
RESULTS OF SURVEY
387 (77%) Responses to questionnaires sent to all (501) federal
district court judges and senior federal district court
judges
23 Cards returned unanswered or nonresponsive:
Reasons:
Nine judges had died, become incapacitated, or
retired from active service.
Two judges found the questions too general to
answer yes or no.
Two judges handled only civil cases.
After answering the first question Yes, despite in-
structions, ten judges answered the second ques-
tion Yes. This would result in conflicting advice to a
plea-convicted defendant.
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364 (73%)
Net responses
54 Fifteen percent of the judges responding advise a
defendant who has plead guilty of the right to ap-
peal and, if indigent, of the right to appeal informa
pauperis.
310 Eighty-five percent of the judges responding do not
advise a plea-convicted defendant of the right to
appeal at sentencing.
94 Twenty-six percent of the judges responding do not
advise a plea-convicted defendant of the right to
appeal at sentencing, and further advise the
defendant at the plea proceeding that pleading
guilty waives the right to direct appeal. This in-
cludes:
a. One judge who had in the past advised plea-
convicted defendants of the right to appeal,
but because of this survey will, in the future,
"advise the defendafit that pleading guilty
waives the right to appeal."
b. One judge, who, although not presently advis-
ing the defendant that pleading guilty waives
the right to direct appeal, will do so in future.
216 Fifty-nine percent of the judges responding do not
advise a plea-convicted defendant of the right to
appeal at sentencing, and do not advise a defendant
prior to accepting the plea that pleading guilty
waives the right to appeal.
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